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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND




In its 1997-98 term, the Supreme Court will decide the case of Yes-
key v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,1 and determine
whether the Americans with Disabilities Act2 ("ADA") applies to
state prisons. The statutory language of the ADA does not address
this question, and courts have relied on different methods of statutory
interpretation to resolve the issue. This Note examines those deci-
sions and argues that many courts have used an inappropriate method
of statutory interpretation to decide whether the ADA applies to state
prisons. Specifically, courts' reliance on textualism to find the "plain
meaning" of the statute without looking to the purpose and intent be-
hind the ADA is misplaced.
The ADA embodies a national policy of non-discrimination against
and reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities. Its pur-
poses are "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in order
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by peo-
ple with disabilities .. .[and] to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individ-
uals with disabilities."3 Its reach is vast: The ADA prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability by public and private employers, state
and local governments, transportation systems, and by private busi-
nesses that provide goods and services to the public.4
The ADA was drafted broadly in order to eliminate discrimination
in these entities and the programs and services they offer.5 Such
broad statutory language, however, is unable to squarely address
every situation which may arise under the statute, creating statutory
* The author would like to thank Professor Katherine Franke, and the editors
and staff of the Fordham Law Review, especially Stacey Horth-Neubert, for their in-
sights and comments.
1. 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. Id. §§ 12101(b)(4), 12101(b)(1).
4. Id. §§ 12111, 12131, 12161, 12182.
5. For example, Title II of the ADA defines discrimination by a public entity as:
"[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be ex-
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
§ 12132.
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ambiguities left for the courts to decide.6 To determine how an issue
should be resolved under the ADA, a court first looks to the statute,
but, because it is possible to disagree on the meaning of almost any
statutory language,7 a court may have to look to other sources for
clarification.8 Which sources the court chooses to look to for guidance
will depend on what method of statutory interpretation the court
uses.9 Historically, courts-and judges and scholars-have disagreed
over the use of various methods of interpretation to discern the mean-
ing of statutory language.10 The most common methods are intention-
alism" and textualism.' 2
In addition, the subject matter or parties covered by certain statutes
will also affect how a court interprets the statutory text.'3 The
Supreme Court has indicated that specific rules apply in particular in-
stances of statutory interpretation. 4
6. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory
State 117-18 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Rights Revolution] (discussing how the pro-
hibition on discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains gaps and "is unin-
formative" on issues like the "role of discriminatory effects" and therefore requires
"judicial answers").
7. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 243 (1993) (construing the
phrase "uses or carries a firearm" and disagreeing on the meaning of the word "use";
the majority arguing that to "use" a gun includes using it for barter, and the dissent
arguing that the "ordinary meaning" of to "use" a gun in this context is as "a
weapon"); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 599-603 (1995) (discussing the history
of "meaning skepticism" regarding the inability of language to "convey clear and de-
terminate commands"); John Polich, Note, Ambiguity of Plain Meaning: Smith v.
United States and the New Textualisin, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 (1994) (arguing that
Smith v. United States reveals the weakness of textualism as an interpretive method).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L Rev.
2071, 2106 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration] ("Statutory ambigu-
ity is common. In the face of ambiguity, outcomes must turn on interpretive princi-
ples of various sorts; there is simply no other way to decide hard cases."); Patricia M.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in tie 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 199 (1983) ("To stop at the purely literal meaning of a
word, phrase, or sentence-if indeed the purely literal meaning can be found-ig-
nores reality. In the context of the statute... words may be capable of many different
meanings, and the literal meaning may be inapplicable or nonsensical.").
9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legis-
lation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 569-71 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge
& Frickey, Cases and Materials].
10. Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at 112.
11. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
13. Eskridge & Frickey, Cases and Materials, supra note 9, at 655-89 (discussing
rules of interpretation that are based upon "substantive policy presumptions," such as
the rule of lenity in criminal cases, interpreting to avoid constitutional problems, and
the strict construction of statutes in derogation of sovereignty).
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law. Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 598-629 (1992)
[hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Last,] (listing various rules, pre-
sumptions, and canons created by the Supreme Court which determine how the Court
will approach the statutory language when interpreting statutes that, for example, in-
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One such rule is applied when a statute affects states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. 5 Another is applied when an ad-
ministrative agency regulation is challenged because it allegedly con-
flicts with the statute under which it was promulgated.' 6 The
approaches the Court takes to the statutory language in these situa-
tions are known, respectively, as the Eleventh Amendment plain
statement rule' 7 and the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to
agency statutory interpretation.' The Eleventh Amendment plain
statement rule requires that when Congress intends for a statute to
abrogate the states' immunity from private suits in federal court, it
must state this intent in unequivocal language. 19 The Chevron doc-
trine of deference says that if the language of a statute is ambiguous or
silent on any particular issue, a court interpreting a statute adminis-
tered by an agency should defer to that agency's reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute.20 Each doctrine establishes a framework for the
court to follow in interpreting the statute.2 1 Thus, courts will interpret
certain statutes using both these categorical requirements and tradi-
tional methods of statutory interpretation.
Courts have used both the Eleventh Amendment plain statement
rule and the Chevron doctrine to interpret the ADA and determine
whether it applies to state prisons.22 In resolving this question, the
Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule requires a court to first
find that the statutory language contains an unambiguous congres-
sional abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.23 If
so, a court following Chevron must then consider whether the Depart-
volve questions of federalism, separation of powers, international law, Indian tribal
immunity, and intergovernmental taxation).
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of
States, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1959, 1959-63 (1994) [hereinafter Note, Clear Statement
Rules].
18. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J.
969, 976 (1992).
19. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985); see also Eskridge
& Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 621 (calling the Eleventh
Amendment plain statement rule a "super-strong clear statement rule focusing on
statutory language alone and requiring a very clear statement by Congress").
20. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984); see also Merrill, supra note 18, at 978 ("Chevron declared that the
agency is the preferred gap filler.").
21. See Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 618-25.
22. Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule bars the
application of the ADA to state prisons), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3474
(U.S. Dec. 19, 1997) (No. 97-1113); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118
F.3d 168, 170-71 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying Chevron and finding that the Department of
Justice regulations make it clear the ADA applies to state prisons), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
23. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243; see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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ment of Justice regulations24 detailing the application of the ADA to
prisons are a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The Chevron
doctrine first requires the court to look at the statutory language of
the ADA to see if Congress intended it to apply to state prisons. 25 If
the court determines that the ADA is ambiguous or silent on the is-
sue, the court, following Chevron, should then defer to the agency's
interpretation.26 Both the Eleventh Amendment and Chevron doc-
trines, therefore, depend on whether the court finds the statutory lan-
guage ambiguous or not, a determination that hinges on the court's
use of either intentionalism or textualism.
All courts that have addressed this question agree that the ADA
satisfies the requirements of the Eleventh Amendment plain state-
ment rule, and abrogates the states' immunity generally.27 The Fourth
Circuit, however, in Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services.28 construed the Eleventh Amendment plain
statement rule to require the ADA to contain an additional abroga-
tion of states' immunity on the specific question of its application to
state prisons.29 The court used textualism to interpret the ADA and
found that Congress did not intend to go so far in abrogating the
states' immunity as to bring state prisons within the coverage of the
ADA.3" Other Circuits have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's anal-
ysis and used different methods of statutory interpretation to conclude
that the ADA applies to state prisons.31 Much of the divergence
among the courts can be traced to the Supreme Court's ongoing disa-
greement regarding the appropriate methods of statutory
interpretation.32
This Note argues that, although the language of the ADA clearly
indicates that it applies to all aspects of state prison operations, courts
that focus solely on the text of the statute fail to interpret the statutory
language correctly. Courts that hesitate to apply the ADA to state
prisons should not construe the text so narrowly as to misinterpret it,
but should look to the statutory purpose and the Department of Jus-
24. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 1191.2, at 342-44 (1997) (reprinting the Americans with
Disability Act Architectural Guidelines 12.1 to 12.6.2) (specifying architectural stan-
dards for detention and correctional facilities).
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see infra note 205 and accompanying text.
26. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Amos, 126 F.3d at 604 (finding that the ADA generally abrogates
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 172-73 (same).
28. 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997).
29. Id. at 600.
30. Id. at 601-02.
31. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on the statutory
language of the ADA to find that state prisons are covered by the ADA), petition for
cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686); Yeskey, 118 F.3d 168
(applying the Chevron doctrine and deferring to the Department of Justice regula-
tions to find that the ADA applies to state prisons): Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
32. See Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at 127-28.
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tice regulations for guidance. Part I examines the purpose and design
of the ADA. Part II discusses various methods of statutory interpre-
tation. Part III provides background on both the Eleventh Amend-
ment plain statement rule and the Chevron doctrine. Part IV
delineates the main arguments made by the courts of appeals, demon-
strating the effect of the Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule
and the Chevron doctrine on the issue of whether the ADA applies to
state prisons. Part V argues that textualism should not be used to
answer the question of whether the ADA applies to state prisons.
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should reject the use of
textualism to decide whether Congress intended for the ADA to apply
to state prisons, and should instead affirm the use of the Chevron doc-
trine in deciding Yeskey.33
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr
When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act34
in 1990, it was heralded as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for peo-
ple with disabilities.35 The ADA is notable in two ways: first, it is the
most comprehensive civil rights statute to date for individuals with
disabilities,36 and second, it mandates an individualized remedy for
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 37  Prior to the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act ("Rehab Act") 31 was the most impor-
tant federal statute for individuals with disabilities. 39 In its most far-
reaching provision, section 504,4° the Rehab Act mandates that recipi-
ents of federal funding not discriminate against and implement affirm-
33. 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994).
35. Glen Elsasser, Senate OKs Rights Bill for Disabled, Chi. Trib., Sept. 8, 1989, at
1 (quoting Senator Tom Harkin).
36. Robert L. Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Impli-
cations of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413,
414-15 (1991) [hereinafter Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications].
37. Id. at 413; see Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of Physical Disability Anti-
discrimination Law: 1976-1996, 20 Mental and Physical Disability L. Rep. 613, 620
(1996).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1994).
39. See Bonnie P. Tucker & Bruce A. Goldstein, 1 Legal Rights of Persons with
Disabilities § 1:3 (1992). The ADA was not intended to supersede or supplant the
Rehab Act, and Congress specifically stated that section 504 of the Rehab Act and
Title II of the ADA should be construed to provide the same "remedies, procedures,
and rights." 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994). Courts have accordingly interpreted the ADA
using Rehab Act case law. As stated by the court in Yeskey, "Congress has directed
that Title II of the ADA be interpreted in a manner consistent with Section 504 [of
the Rehab Act], and all the leading cases take up the statutes together, as will we."
118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Section 504 states in part: "No otherwise qualified
individual with a disability in the United States,... shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . ." Id.
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ative action programs to benefit individuals with disabilities." Other
statutes target more specific sub-groups of those covered by the
ADA,42 and cover only those programs and activities either conducted
by the federal government or by an entity receiving federal funds.13
Furthermore, they focus heavily on education, employment, and voca-
tional rehabilitation, rather than granting the disabled a general right
against discrimination.' In contrast, the ADA mandates the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals vith disabilities by both pub-
lic and private entities4" and demands that these individuals be
integrated into all aspects of society.46 To accomplish this goal, the
ADA prohibits discrimination by private employers,4 7 state and local
governments,48 transportation systems,49 and providers of public
accommodations.50
41. See Laura F. Rothstein, Disabilities and the Law § 1.02, at 3 (1992). For exam-
ple, every federal agency was required to develop a plan for the "hiring, placement,
and advancement in employment of individuals . . .with disabilities." 29 U.S.C.
§ 791(c) (1994).
42. These statutes include the Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157
(1994) (mandating access and a barrier-free environment in federally funded build-
ings), the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, now known as the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994) (requiring the
provision of "special education and related services" designed to meet the needs of
children with disabilities), and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994) (describing the rights of individuals with
disabilities).
43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (limiting discrimination from programs to
those which are "receiving Federal financial assistance" or those conducted by the
Federal government itself); Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 36, at
428-29.
44. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (describing an "individual with a disability" as
anyone with an impairment that "results in a substantial impediment to employ-
ment"); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripgples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabili-
ties, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1407 (1993) (calling for society to end its "systematic,
stigmatizing, subordination" by allowing full participation of people with disabilities
in all areas of society). While the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994), attempted to establish substantive rights
for individuals with disabilities, the Supreme Court held in Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman, that it did not impose any obligations upon the states and,
consequently, did not provide a private right of action for its enforcement. 451 U.S. 1,
18, 27-28 (1981).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
46. Id § 12101(a)(8).
47. Id. § 12111(5).
48. Id. § 12131(1)(A).
49. Id § 12161.
50. Id § 12182.
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In contrast to prior statutes, the ADA covers public entities.5' Title
II of the ADA 52 states that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a pub-
lic entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 3 It
further defines "public entity" as "any State or local government [and]
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumen-
tality of a State or States or local government."54 To have a successful
claim against a public entity under the ADA, the plaintiff must meet
three criteria: (1) the plaintiff must be found to be a "qualified indi-
vidual5" with a disability,"56 (2) who has been discriminated 57 against
(3) because of their disability, by a public entity. If an individual with
a disability is found to have been unlawfully discriminated against, the
public entity must make reasonable accommodations or modifications
for that person,58 unless such accommodation or modification creates
an undue hardship for the entity or fundamentally alters the pro-
gram. 9 While this is the basic framework of the ADA, the next two
51. Other statutes applied to individual agencies of certain state and local govern-
ments only if they received federal funds. For example, the Rehab Act applies to
employers who have received federal contracts and grants. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794
(1994).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Title II, applying to public entities including
any state agency, is the relevant section to determine whether the ADA applies to
prisons.
53. Id. § 12132.
54. Id. § 12131(1).
55. Under Title II, which covers state and local governments, a qualified
individual:
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modi-
fications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, commu-
nication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and
services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of serv-
ices or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id. § 12131(2).
56. The ADA defines a "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of that [individual's] major life activities ... ; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 12102(2).
57. Title II defines discrimination as the "exclu[sion] from participation in or...
den[ial] [of] benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or ...
subject[ion] to discrimination by any such entity." Id. U.S.C. § 12132.
58. The ADA leaves the definitions of reasonable accommodation or modification
vague so as not to preclude any type of alteration that may be necessary. See id.
§ 12111(9) (defining "reasonable accommodation" by listing changes that it "may
include").
59. Title II, unlike Titles I and III, does not contain any exceptions but, like all
other sections of the ADA, contains the term "reasonable accommodation." The reg-
ulations promulgated under the ADA provide that reasonable accommodation will
not be required for existing facilities of a public entity if it would "result in a funda-




sections examine the structure of the ADA as well as its
implementation.
A. The ADA and Agencies
To effectuate the ADA's ambitious program, Congress delegated
the authority to issue regulations to several agencies.' Because the
reach of the ADA is vast and because it requires an individualized
case-by-case approach to identifying and resolving claims of discrimi-
nation,61 it is necessary to have agencies Nvith flexibility, expertise, and
adaptability to address the array of issues that arise under the stat-
ute.62 Title II of the ADA grants the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
the authority to implement the application of the ADA to state and
local governments.63 The DOJ regulations,' mirroring the broad lan-
guage of the ADA, state that the ADA covers "all services, programs,
and activities provided or made available by public entities ' '"5 without
exception, and is meant to "appl[y] to anything a public entity does."'
Accordingly, the DOJ regulations explicitly identify prisons as among
the programs covered under both the Rehab Act and the ADA.67
Furthermore, the DOJ and the Architectural and Transportation Bar-
riers Compliance Board ("the Board") have created guidelines spe-
60. See id § 35.190 for a list of designated agencies. See also S. Rep. No. 101-116,
at 43 (1989), where the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources said that:
"[tihe [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission's regulations [under the ADA]
will have the force and effect of law."
61. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
62. For a snapshot of what issues arise under the ADA, the DOJ ADA web page
provides updates on current suits and settlements. Department of Justice, Enforcing
the ADA: A Status Report From the Department of Justice (October-December 1997)
(visited Mar. 11, 1998) <httpJ/vvw.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/octdec97.htm>. For example, a
recent status report lists the following lawsuits: a suit against the District of Columbia
for TDD access for its 911 emergency response system; a suit against a national chain
of motels for violations of the ADA Standards for Accessible Design; a suit against a
hospital for failing to provide a sign language interpreter and other auxiliary aids to a
deaf patient. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1994).
64. The regulations under Title II of the ADA incorporate those from the Rehab
Act. Department of Justice, Title II Technical Assistance Manual: Covering State and
Local Government Programs and Services II-1.1000, at 1 (1993) [hereinafter Title II
Technical Assistance Manual].
65. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1997).
66. Id. pt. 35, app. A, subpt. A at 466.
67. Id § 42.540(h) (stating that "program" under the Rehab Act includes a "de-
partment of corrections"); id. pt. 542 (establishing an Administrative Remedy Proce-
dure for handling inmate grievances under the Rehab Act in Federal penal
institutions); id § 35.190(6) (stating that the DOJ is the designated agency under the
ADA for "[a]ll programs, services, and regulatory activities relating to law enforce-
ment.... including ... correctional institutions"); Title II Technical Assistance Man-
ual, supra note 64, 11-6.3300(6), at 35 (outlining the Americans with Disabilities Act
Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) and Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards
(UFAS) requirements for jails and prisons).
68. Congress originally created the Board pursuant to § 502 of the Rehab Act to
ensure compliance with the Architectural Barriers Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157
2240 [Vol. 66
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cifically for prisons that address architectural barriers.69 Under Title
II of the ADA, covered entities must now comply with either the
ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities
("ADAAG") or the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards
("UFAS").7 ° The ADAAG are issued by the Board, which, after a
detailed notice and comment period,7 promulgated regulations spe-
cific to architectural barriers in prisons.72 These guidelines provide
standards for entrances, security systems, visiting areas, holding and
housing cells, and medical facilities.73 One notable aspect of the regu-
lations reflects consideration of the nature of jails and prisons-they
explicitly provide exceptions for security reasons.74 Fidelity to the
ADA's overall goal of integration, however, led the Board to refuse to
allow the prisons to segregate prisoners with disabilities but, rather, to
require that they be integrated into the general prison population.75
Thus, the agency assigned to implement Title II of the ADA found
that it applied to prisons for the following reasons: first, the DOJ reg-
ulations under the Rehab Act apply the Act to prisons; second, Con-
gress instructed the DOJ to incorporate the Rehab Act regulations
into its ADA regulations; and third, applying the ADA to prisons is
consistent with the broad mandate of the statutory language, espe-
cially that of Title II, which contains no exceptions to the public enti-
ties it covers.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
The unique problems that arise in discrimination against individuals
with disabilities were evident to Congress when it drafted the ADA.
For this reason, the ADA does not remedy discrimination in the same
manner as other civil rights statutes. For example, under Title VII of
(1994). The Board is responsible for implementing the ADA in all new and altered
facilities, and the DOJ enforces the ADA in all existing facilities. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,698
(1994).
69. Title II Technical Assistance Manual, supra note 64, 11-6.3300(6), at 35 (listing
the standards under the ADAAG and UFAS for jails and prisons); 36 C.F.R. § 1191.2,
at 342-44 (1997) (reprinting ADAAG 12.1 to 12.6.2) (specifying architectural stan-
dards for detention and correctional facilities).
70. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c) (1997). The UFAS specifies "jails, prisons .... [and]
other detention or other correctional facilities" as entities to which the standards ap-
ply. 41 C.F.R. subpt. 101-19.6, app. A at 154 (1997) (reprinting UFAS 4.1.4).
71. See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 31,698 (1994) (outlining the responses received to
the proposed guidelines on architectural and structural requirements).
72. See 36 C.F.R. § 1191.2, at 342-44 (1997) (ADAAG 12.1 to 12.6.2).
73. Id.
74. Id. In addition, for comments made during the notice and comment period for
the regulations, see 59 Fed. Reg. 31,699 (1994) ("[E]xceptions to certain requirements
based on necessary security considerations are stated generally."); id. at 31,700 ("Sev-
eral commenters noted that signage, particularly that which is raised and brailled, can
pose a security risk since it can be removed from walls .... [T]he exception clarifies
that the.., requirements for accessible signage... apply only to public use areas.").
75. See 59 Fed. Reg. 31,704 (1994).
1998] 2241
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer is not permitted to consider
a person's race, or gender, inter alia, in evaluating their abilities. 76
Congress enacted this blanket prohibition on discrimination because
characteristics such as race or gender have no bearing on an individ-
ual's ability. In contrast, an individual's disability may affect their
abilities, and77 special measures may be required to provide that per-
son -with equal opportunities. To address this problem, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") 78 passed the
folowing regulation under the Rehab Act: "A recipient [of federal
funds] shall make reasonable accommodation to the known [disabili-
ties] of an otherwise qualified ... applicant or employee unless...
[such] accommodation would impose an undue hardship."'79 This reg-
ulation, and the concepts of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" were incorporated wholesale into the ADA.' Conse-
quently, the covered entity must consider whether reasonable modifi-
cations"' would allow the individual to meet program requirements
when deciding whether the individual is qualified to participate. Even
if modifications are possible, the covered entity does not have to com-
ply if such modification will "result in a fundamental alteration in the
nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and ad-
ministrative burdens." 8 Because of the importance of the rights at
stake, the reasonableness inquiry is a high standard, and the burden of
proof rests on the public entity to prove that the accommodation
would be unreasonable. 3 Thus, if reasonable modification would
either not enable the individual with a disability to perform the essen-
76. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) (1994); Feldblum, supra note 37, at 614; Tucker & Goldstein,
supra note 39, § 1:2.
77. Tucker & Goldstein, supra note 39, § 1:2.
78. Now known as Health and Human Services ("HHS"), this agency has the au-
thority to promulgate regulations under the Rehab Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
The responsibility for implementing regulations under § 504 of the Rehab Act was
transferred from HEW/HHS to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1980, and the
regulations promulgated by HEW/HHS were adopted by the DOJ. See 45 Fed. Reg.
72,995, 72,997 (1980); Rothstein, supra note 41, § 1.02, at 5.
79. 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (1997) (emphasis added).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (defining "reasonable accommodation"); id.
§ 12111(10) (defining "undue hardship"); see also Feldblum, supra note 37, at 617
(stating that many sections of the first draft of the ADA were directly lifted from the
Rehab Act's § 504 regulations). Under the ADA regulations, this concept of -undue
hardship" is also called "undue burden." See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1997).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). Under Title II of the ADA, any public entity that
provides services, programs, or benefits may have to make reasonable modifications
"to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or trans-
portation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services." Id. § 12131(2); see,
e.g., D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 813 F. Supp. 217 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that to comply with the reasonable accommodation requirement, the
defendant must provide the vision-impaired plaintiff with aids and extra time to take
the state bar exam).
82. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1997).
83. kd pt. 35, app. A at 483; see Johnson v. Gambrinus CoJSpoetzl Brewery, 116
F.3d 1052, 1063-65 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant had the burden of prov-
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tial functions, or would be an undue hardship on the entity, an entity
is not required to make the modifications in order to comply with the
ADA.8
Requiring reasonable accommodation serves the ADA's ultimate
goal of integrating individuals with disabilities, as opposed to segre-
gating or institutionalizing them.85 To achieve this goal, the ADA
must enable society to overcome a particular type of discrimination:
that which has a "disparate impact,"86 and is the product of "over-
sight"87 and "benign neglect. '88 The ADA requires covered entities
to remedy this kind of discrimination-even though it is uninten-
tional-because it is necessary to achieve the ADA's goal of complete
integration. Reasonable accommodation is specifically tailored to this
kind of discriminatory practice, ensuring that individuals are accom-
modated to the largest extent possible without imposing changes upon
covered entities that may be excessive.8 9
The ADA seeks to highlight the assumptions that underlie societal
environments. 90 It is not an accident that much of the ADA and its
regulations center on architectural issues9' and the availability of aids
ing that allowing service and guide dogs on tours would create a health risk and fun-
damentally alter the operations of the brewery).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994).
85. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition
of Disability, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 409, 513-14 (1997) [hereinafter Burgdorf, The Special
Treatment Model] (arguing that in order to enable individuals with disabilities to fully
participate in society, reasonable accommodation seeks to address the individual's
abilities, and discussing how facilities, jobs, services, and programs are generally
designed for a participant with full mental and physical abilities).
86. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 287, 296-97 (1985) (holding that, while
a cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires intent, the
Rehab Act does not, because to require intent would prevent the statute from reme-
dying "disparate-impact" discrimination). Disparate impact discrimination occurs
when a practice adversely affects one group more than another, even when it was not
intended to do so. Id. at 292-94; see also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADA is "intended to cover both intentional discrimina-
tion and discrimination as a result of facially neutral laws").
87. Burgdorf, The Special Treatment Model, supra note 85, at 517-18.
88. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 & n.12 (1985); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46
F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the ADA does not require a showing of
discriminatory animus "[b]ecause the ADA evolved from an attempt to remedy the
effects of 'benign neglect' resulting from the 'invisibility' of the disabled, [and] Con-
gress could not have intended it to limit the Act's protections and prohibitions to
circumstances involving deliberate discrimination").
89. Burgdorf, The Special Treatment Model, supra note 85, at 526.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (defining the requirement of reasonable accommoda-
tion in the workplace); id. § 12131 (defining the requirement of reasonable accommo-
dation for any service, program, or activity provided by a public entity); id.
§ 12182(2)(A)(ii) (requiring reasonable modifications by public accommodations).
91. See, e.g., id. § 12146 (requiring new transportation facilities be accessible to
individuals with disabilities including those who use wheelchairs); 28 C.F.R. § 35.163
(1997) (requiring public entities to provide signage directing users to an accessible
entrance).
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and devices. 92 These barriers can undermine integration regardless of
the presence of intentional discrimination, and removing them is in-
tended to place individuals with disabilities in a position equal to
those without disabilities.93 This crucial balancing aspect of the
ADA-weighing the needs of the individual with a disability against
the effect of the accommodation on the public entity-has, however,
either been overlooked or largely misunderstood by both the public
and courts.94 Because the ADA is different from other nondiscrimi-
natory statutes-in that it specifically targets practices that have the
effect of denying equal participation to people with disabilities and
provides for reasonable accommodation rather than a bright line pro-
hibition-courts should seek guidance in the statutory history, pur-
pose, and in the appropriate agency regulations when interpreting the
ADA.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Because judges are supposed to interpret-rather than make-the
law, judges are limited in the sources they can rely on to interpret
statutory language.95 Traditionally, these sources have been "the lan-
guage, structure, and history of the relevant act."'  A revitalized ar-
gument about judicial legitimacy,97 however, has lead the members of
92. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994) (defining auxiliary aids under the ADA as
including qualified interpreters and readers, and taped texts).
93. Burgdorf, The Special Treatment Model, supra note 85, at 528. Burgdorf ar-
gues that to see reasonable accommodation as special treatment is to focus on the
disability rather than on the discriminatory assumptions and practices of the entities
covered under the ADA. Id. at 535-36.
94. See, e.g., Myths and Facts About the Americans with Disabilities Act (visited
Feb. 24, 1998) <http'.www.usdoj.gov/crt/adalpubsmythfct.txt> (listing examples of
representative myths such as "The Justice Department sues first and asks questions
later," and "The ADA requires extensive renovation of all state and local government
buildings to make them accessible"); see also Common Questions About Title 1 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http'J/w/wv.usdoj.govJ
crtlada/pubs/t2qa.txt> (listing common questions such as "Are there any limitations
on the program accessibility requirement?" and "Is a city required to modify its poli-
cies whenever requested in order to accommodate individuals with disabilities?");
Burgdorf, The Special Treatment Model, supra note 85, at 513.
95. See Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at 112-13; Bradford C. Mank, Is
a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Prag-
matic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 Wash. & Lee L
Rev. 1231, 1237-40 (1996).
96. Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at 112; see also Stephen Breyer, On
the Uses of Legislative History In Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L Rev. 845, 845-47
(1992) (defending the use of legislative history when interpreting unclear statutory
language and calling it the "classical practice"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 624 (1990) (describing the "traditional approach"
as using the text of the statute to govern its interpretation, "unless negated by strongly
contradictory legislative history").
97. Eskridge, supra note 96, at 646-48 (linking the advent of textualism to the
"revival" of formalism and its argument that intentionalism permits the "judicial usur-
pation of legislative power").
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the Supreme Court to utilize two distinct methods of interpretation. 8
Each method has its own tools, and, more often than not, leads to very
different interpretations of the same statute.99
Intentionalism'00 looks to the text, legislative history, and statutory
purpose to discern the intent of the legislature when it chose the
words used in a statute.' 0' Intentionalism posits the court's role as
"law-declaring" and, if the statutory language is unclear, searches the
statute's legislative history to determine how Congress intended the
statutory language to be understood."w In using this method, courts
look to the statute's legislative history, such as congressional floor de-
bates and committee reports, to understand the statute's purpose and
context. 0 3
Textualism, in contrast, posits that Congress expresses its intent
solely through the enacted language.' 4 Textualism searches for the
ordinary meaning of the statutory text-what it would mean to the
"typical lay reader"-because that is the meaning Congress most
likely intended the words to have. 0 5 If the statutory language is too
broad or vague to have a clear meaning, textualists rely on the lan-
guage of the statute, dictionaries,'10 6 "common sense," "ordinary
98. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invita-
tion to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749,
754-62 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Hypertextualism] (discussing six Supreme Court de-
cisions during the 1993-94 Term interpreting agency-administered statutes and in
which the majority and dissent disagreed both on the appropriate method of statutory
interpretation to use and on the meaning of the statute).
99. Id. at 749-52.
100. Another interpretive method, very similar to intentionalism, is purposivism.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 332-34 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Statu-
tory Interpretation]. Purposivism looks at the general spirit or purpose of the legisla-
tion, especially if congressional intent on the specific issue is unclear. Id. Purposivism
also assumes "the legislature is filled with reasonable people who will reach reason-
able.., results." Id. at 334. Eskridge and Frickey call purposivism "modified inten-
tionalism." Id. at 324. Sunstein, agreeing that the two are similar, distinguishes them
by describing intentionalism as seeking to discover how the enacting legislature
wanted the question to be resolved whereas purposivism looks to the purpose behind
the legislation generally. Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at 127. This Note
follows the Eskridge and Frickey approach and uses "intentionalism" to include
"purposivism."
101. Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 98, at 749.
102. Breyer, supra note 96, at 847; see Sunstein, Rights Revolution, supra note 6, at
127.
103. Breyer, supra note 96, at 845-48.
104. Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67
S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 587 (1994).
105. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 1437, 1441 (1994) [hereinafter Note, Looking It Up]. Former Congressman Ab-
ner Mikva argued that "[w]hen Congress uses a word, the word means what Congress
says it means, all the dictionary definitions to the contrary notwithstanding." Abner J.
Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 Duke L.J. 380, 386.
106. Note, Looking It Up, supra note 105, at 1441-42.
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meaning,"' 7 and rules of grammar l0 to find the objective meaning of
the text.'0 9 They oppose the use of traditional extrinsic sources, such
as legislative history, because those words and opinions were not en-
acted and, therefore, are not law. 10 Textualists argue that statutory
words are the only legitimate source for meaning, and to go beyond
those words transforms "judicial interpretation into judicial
'legislation."""
Intentionalism and textualism have the same goal: to interpret stat-
utes according to the meaning Congress enacted.' 12 They disagree,
however, on how best to be faithful to that goal. Although either
method should ideally lead to the same conclusion regarding the
meaning of a statute, many times they result in vastly different inter-
pretations. In determining whether the ADA applies to state prisons,
the courts which use textualism reach a different conclusion than the
courts which use intentionalism, because the outcome of the Eleventh
Amendment and Chevron doctrines-which, as discussed below, are
relevant to resolve this inquiry-depend heavily on statutory interpre-
tation. Because of this divergence, it is important to determine which
interpretive method a court uses and whether another method would
lead to the same conclusion.
mH. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND CHEVRON DOCTRINES
Part III provides background on the concerns and purposes that in-
form the Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule and the Chevron
doctrine of deference to agency interpretations. Once invoked, these
doctrines direct courts to find that a statute satisfies certain require-
ments-a task which requires statutory interpretation. Thus, it is im-
portant to note how different methods of interpretation may affect the
interpreting court's conclusion whether the statute meets the require-
ments of either doctrine.
107. See supra note 7 (discussing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), where
both the majority and the dissent claimed they had discerned the "ordinary meaning"
of "to use a gun").
108. Pierce, Hypertextualism, supra note 98, at 750.
109. Mank, supra note 95, at 1237-39.
110. Id; see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 Duke LJ. 511, 517 (describing looking for congressional intent as -a wild-
goose chase"). Typical complaints about utilizing congressional intent include: it as-
sumes (1) that all members of Congress had a single intent; and (2) that such intent
would be expressed and discoverable in legislative history. See Eskridge, supra note
96, at 640-45. Stephen Breyer argues that such problems disappear if one thinks of
Congress as an institution and its intent as a "purpose" rather than as a "motive."
Breyer, supra note 96, at 864-66.
111. Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 902 (1982); see Sunstein, Rights Revolu-
tion, supra note 6, at 128.
112. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 100, at 325-26, 34042.
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A. The Eleventh Amendment Doctrine
The Eleventh Amendment' 1 3 was passed to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,1 4 and to reassert the pre-
Chisholm understanding of federal jurisdiction: that under the Article
III state-citizen diversity clause, unconsenting states retained their im-
munity to lawsuits in federal court." 5 By its own terms, the Amend-
ment bars federal courts from hearing suits brought by out-of-state
and foreign citizens against unconsenting states." 6 The Supreme
Court has extended the doctrine to prohibit suits brought by citizens
against their own state." 7 This jurisdictional bar, however, can be
overcome in a number of ways." 8 For one, states can waive their im-
113. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
Const. amend. XI.
114. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that a South Carolina citizen could sue the
State of Georgia for assumpsit in federal court, because Article III grants federal
courts jurisdiction over controversies between states and citizens of another state).
115. William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of An Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohi-
bition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1046-51 (1983). During the ratifica-
tion of the United States Constitution, the state-citizen diversity clause was argued to
either provide only a neutral forum or to apply only when states were plaintiffs, but
no one thought it could be applied to expose states to liability. Id. Chisholm was the
first case decided under the new Constitution. Id. at 1054. Whether states' immunity
to suits in federal court derives from common law or from the Constitution has re-
cently been debated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole held that "the Eleventh Amendment reflects the 'funda-
mental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial authority in
Article III.' Id. at 64 (citations omitted). The dissent disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that sovereign immunity mandates the preclusion of "all federal jurisdic-
tion over an unconsenting state," id. at 144 (citation omitted), and argued that immu-
nity was a common-law value not meant to be given constitutional status. Id. at 130-31
(Souter, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent argued that immunity "reaches only to
suits subject to federal jurisdiction exclusively under the Citizen-State Diversity
Clauses." Id. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also the Court's decision in Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), where the majority and dissent
disagreed on whether or not the principle of state sovereign immunity is derived from
the Constitution. Justice Brennan argued in dissent that "[tihere simply is no consti-
tutional principal of state sovereign immunity." Id. at 259 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.11, at 47 (5th
ed. 1995).
117. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment barred a suit by a citizen of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana for the
State's violation of federal law arising from its default on interest payments on its
bonds); see also William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261, 1261-62 (1989) (asserting
that the bar against unconsented suits brought by in-state citizens rests on the princi-
ple of the Eleventh Amendment, but not on its text).
118. George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Elev-
enth Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 Geo. L.J. 363, 366 (1985); Fletcher, supra
note 117, at 1261-62; Jesse Michael Feder, Note, Congressional Abrogation of State
Sovereign Immunity, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1436, 1437-40 (1986).
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munity. 19 In addition, the Court held in Ex parte Young 120 that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against individual state of-
ficers for the prospective enforcement of federal law.' 2' Finally, Con-
gress can abrogate the immunity pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 122
Whether the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar has been
overcome by abrogation in any particular statute is a matter of statu-
tory interpretation. For this question, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped the plain statement rule: "Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention clear in the language of the statute."'-' There has
been a shift, however, in methods of statutory interpretation used by
the Court to discern congressional intent to abrogate.
In its 1973 decision, Employees v. Missouri Department of Public
Health and Welfare,'24 the Court stated that congressional intent to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity must be "clear."' - A year later,
119. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304-09 (1990)
(finding waiver when a state accepts federal funds under a statute that clearly indi-
cates that state may be sued in federal court); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73
(1974) (finding that a state's receipt of federal funds constitutes a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity only where Congress explicitly required a waiver); Feder,
supra note 118, at 1437-40.
120. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
121. Id at 160 (holding that a suit challenging the federal constitutionality of a state
official's action is not a suit against the state). In addition, in Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an award
of attorney's fees against officers of the state's Department of Corrections in their
official capacities for the officers' bad faith failure to cure constitutional violations in
prison. Id. The Court ruled that the power to impose fines is ancillary to the federal
court's power to impose injunctive relief under !Er Parte Young. Id.; see also Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment lmnnity?, 106 Yale I.J. 1683, 1686
(1997) (explaining that Ex Parte Young "means that the Eleventh Amendment inhib-
its only retrospective relief for a state's past violations of federal law").
122. Vazquez, supra note 121, at 1687-88. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1 (1989), the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate the states'
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996), the Court overruled its holding in Union Gas that the Interstate Commerce
Clause included the power to abrogate states' immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The Court found that Congress did not have the power to abrogate under the
Indian Commerce Clause, as Article I powers "cannot be used to circumvent the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." Id. at 72-73. Both the Indian
and the Interstate Commerce Clauses are Article I powers. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8,
cl. 3.
123. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). The Court stated:
To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abrogation with due concern
for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our consti-
tutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: "Congress
may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in fed-
eral court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute."
Id. at 227-28 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
124. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
125. Id. at 285.
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in Edelman v. Jordan,1 26 the Court raised the requirement a notch,
stating that "we will find waiver only where 'stated by the most ex-
press language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.1'1 2 7 In
Quern v. Jordan,12 however, the Court appeared willing to look at
extrinsic sources such as legislative history for congressional intent. 29
Finally, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,130 the
Court said that there must be "an unequivocal expression of congres-
sional intent.' 13 ' It was not until Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon'132 in 1985 that the Court limited the search for intent to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity to the "unmistakable language in the stat-
ute itself.'
33
In Atascadero, the Court first articulated its current version of the
plain statement rule.13 1 The plaintiff, diabetic and blind in one eye,
sued Atascadero State Hospital, alleging that it refused to hire him as
a recreational therapist because of his disability in violation of § 504
of the Rehab Act.'35 The plaintiff argued that the legislative history
and the purpose of the statute demonstrated that Congress had in-
tended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and
permit suits against them.' 36 The plaintiff relied on prior Supreme
Court decisions that found abrogation using this type of evidence.1 37
In holding that the Rehab Act did not abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, the Court articulated a new standard by which
courts should examine statutory language to determine congressional
intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 138 Dis-
126. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
127. Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling, Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
128. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
129. The Court said:
neither logic, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor the legislative history of the 1871 Act compels, or even
warrants, a leap from this proposition to the conclusion that Congress in-
tended by the general language of the Act to overturn the constitutionally
guaranteed immunity of the several States.
Id. at 342.
130. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
131. Id. at 99.
132. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
133. Id. at 243.
134. Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1962.
135. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
136. Id. at 242. The dissent also argued that the legislative history supported find-
ing an intent to abrogate, stating that "[t]he legislative history confirms that the
States' were among the primary targets of § 504," and quoting Representative Vanik:
"Our Governments tax ... people [with disabilities], their parents and relatives, but
fail to provide services for them ... ." Id. at 249 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 117
Cong. Rec. 45,974 (Dec. 9, 1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)).
137. See supra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
138. Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 621 (calling
the Court's new standard a "steroidal transformation" from its previous definition of
the plain statement rule); see also Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1962
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regarding the plaintiff's use of legislative history, the Court said that
the intention to abrogate must be "unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute,"'139 but did not say what language would be sufficient.
Because the Court found that the language of the Rehab Act was not
"unmistakably clear," the Court held that the Rehab Act did not per-
mit private suits in federal court against states for violations of the
Act." Thus, the Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule's origi-
nal intentionalist test for determining whether Congress meant to ab-
rogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity statutorily has evolved
into a textualist test for determining whether a statute contains such
an abrogation.' 4 1
1. The Plain Statement Rule and Federalism
The plain statement rule seeks to preserve the balance of power
between the states and the federal government, by making Congress
fully consider and unequivocally state its intention to create private
rights of action against states for violations of federal law.1 42 The rule
reflects the "fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal
Government and the States' 143 and the "fundamental principle of sov-
ereign immunity" behind the Eleventh Amendment.'"
If Congress fails to adopt the language required by the Supreme
Court's plain statement rule, the Court will find that the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against states brought by private citizens in
federal court under a federal statute.141 Congress can, however, draft
or amend a statute to include the language necessary to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.'" Indeed, after Atascadero, Congress quickly
amended the Rehab Act to include a statement of abrogation.' 47 The
Supreme Court has since recognized the amended language as suffi-
cient to indicate intent to abrogate states' immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment."4 The ADA also contains the same language as
(describing Atascadero as the "leading case in the Court's modem clear statement
jurisprudence").
139. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
140. Id.
141. Eskridge and Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 621.
142. Id. at 633 (asserting that the Court considers norms like federalism to be un-
derenforced and require protection through clear statement rules).
143. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238.
144. Id (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984)).
145. Brown, supra note 118, at 364-65.
146. See Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1967.
147. The Atascadero decision was overruled by amendments to the Rehab Act in
1986. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
148. See Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092, 2099 (1996). The Court described the re-
sponse to Atascadero as an "unambiguous waiver of the States' sovereign immunity."
Id. at 2100. The language approved by the Court stated: "A State shall not be im-
mune under the Eleventh Amendment... from suit in Federal Court for a violation
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)
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the amended Rehab Act: "A State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment ....,,4 If the plain statement rule's effect is
limited by the ability of Congress to "learn the rule" and to comply by
using unequivocal language, its effect could mistakenly be seen as in-
consequential. The evolution of the textualist doctrine, however, has
major implications for Congress's ability to abrogate states' immunity
to suits in federal court in light of recent Supreme Court decisions
involving the plain statement rule.
2. Extension of the Plain Statement Rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft
In Gregory v. Ashcrofl,15 the Court applied the Eleventh Amend-
ment plain statement rule in a Tenth Amendment 151 context.15 2 The
Court held that state judges were not covered by the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act'53 ("ADEA") because it was ambiguous
whether the statute's exception for appointees "on the policymaking
level" included judges.' 54 The Court stated that if Congress intended
the ADEA to apply to state judges-an area the Court considered at
"the heart of representative government 1 5 5 and a "state governmen-
tal function"a 6 -its intentions must be clear.'57 As Justice White
pointed out, this was a significant extension of the plain statement rule
previously applied in Atascadero.158 While the Court in Atascadero
used the plain statement rule to determine whether the statute applied
to the states generally, here the Court used the rule to decide the "dis-
(1994). Furthermore, the Court recognized that the amendment was a response to
their decision: "Section 1003 was enacted in response to our decision in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon .... By enacting § 1003, Congress sought to provide the sort
of unequivocal waiver that our precedents demand." 116 S. Ct. at 2099.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994).
150. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
151. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. The Gregory court found that
the power to determine the required qualifications for ones' own government officials
was a "power reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment." 501 U.S. at 463.
152. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (finding that Atascadero was an Eleventh
Amendment case, but that a similar approach is applied in other contexts). Although
Gregory was a Tenth Amendment case, the Court quoted from Atascadero for the
proposition that "[I1f Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance be-
tween the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."' Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
In describing the Gregory decision, Eskridge and Frickey state that "[riather than
relying upon conventional interpretive methods and canons, [Justice 0' Connor] cre-
ated a new super-strong clear statement rule for federal regulation of at least some
state functions." Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 624.
153. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
154. 501 U.S. at 465.
155. Id. at 463 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984)).
156. Id. at 470.
157. Id. at 467.
158. Id. at 476 (White, J., concurring).
1998] 2251
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
pute... over the precise details of the statute's application."' 59 The
Gregory majority reasoned that the use of the clear statement rule was
necessary in this case because the situation concerned a state's consti-
tutional provision for mandatory retirement as applied to a state
judge. The Court termed it a "provision [that] goes beyond an area
traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most funda-
mental sort for a sovereign entity. Through... the character of those
who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a
sovereign."'160
These notions of core state principles and traditional government
functions are a direct reference to the Court's prior decision in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,161 which was subsequently overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 62 The Na-
tional League Court attempted to preserve the state-federal govern-
ment balance by holding that the Tenth Amendment protected the
states' "traditional governmental functions" from federal regula-
tion.163 The Court soon decided, however, that this inquiry into what
were "traditional," or "integral" state functions was "unsound in prin-
cipal and unworkable in practice."'" In Garcia, the Court held that it
no longer would impose its own notions of federalism through a judi-
cial interpretation of the Tenth Amendment.1 65 Instead, the Court
reasoned that the states had adequate protection through the struc-
ture of the federal system,166 and, therefore, the Court relinquished
the authority to maintain the state-federal balance to Congress. 67
Since Garcia, members of the Court who disagreed with its hold-
ing'68 have developed means by which to re-establish the National
League test, thereby re-asserting the Court's role in maintaining the
principles of federalism. 69 In Gregory, for example, the Court articu-
159. Id. In contrast, in School Board v. Arline, it was the dissent that argued that
the plain statement rule should be used to determine whether Congress meant to
abrogate the states' immunity under the Rehab Act as to a specific area of regulation,
as opposed to using it merely to determine whether the statute in general abrogated
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 480 U.S. 273, 289-93 (1987) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
160. 501 U.S. at 460.
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
162. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
163. National League, 426 U.S. at 852.
164. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
165. See Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1961.
166. 469 U.S. at 550-51. The Court found that the limitations on Congress's Article
I power, the role of the states and their citizens in electing the legislative and execu-
tive branches, and the equal representative of the states in the Senate all provided
adequate protection against congressional overreaching. Id.
167. Id. at 555-56; Brown, supra note 118, at 376-79.
168. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Powell
dissented in Garcia. See 469 U.S. at 557.
169. The Garcia dissent saw the majority's decision as an abandonment of judicial
review in determining whether Congress has transgressed the "constitutional limits on
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lated a new means to restrict the reach of federal legislation.17 0 Greg-
ory was, however, not a wholesale reversal of Garcia. First, the
Gregory Court found the case to be one that went beyond being just a
traditional state function because it involved the right to choose the
qualifications for elected officials.17' Furthermore, the Court specifi-
cally noted that although the "principles of federalism ... are attenu-
ated when Congress acts" pursuant to its section five powers, the
"States' power to define the qualifications of their officeholders has
force.., against the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1' 72
Moreover, although the Gregory Court said Congress must make its
intent "plain," it also said that Congress was not required to create a
comprehensive list of all the traditional state functions to which it in-
tends the federal law to apply.' 73 What exactly Gregory requires,
however, and how it will be applied is unclear.174
3. The Effect of Textualism and the Plain Statement Rule
Atascadero established that the question of whether Congress in-
tended to abrogate states' immunity generally is a textualist inquiry.
Although the Court hesitated to make the Gregory test a textualist
one, it did not refer to legislative history.175 Textualism could prevent
its power." Id. at 566-67 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also James F. Blumstein, Federal-
ism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 Vand. L. Rev.
1251, 1287-91 (1994) (arguing that the decisions in Gregory and New York v. United
States represent post-Garcia judicial limitations on federal power which do not disturb
the "analytical framework of Garcia," but are "nonetheless at odds with the prevail-
ing normative view in Garcia"); Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra
note 14, at 634-35 (arguing that Gregory threatens to re-establish the same unprinci-
pled standards the Court disavowed in Garcia); Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 903-04 (1994)
(stating that the Court, a "mere six years after its brave declaration that it had sworn
off federalism for good," had "suffered a relapse" in deciding Gregory on principles of
federalism).
170. See Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1973.
171. 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
172. Id. at 468.
173. Id. at 467.
174. See Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 633-34. But see Michael P.
Lee, Comment, How Clear is "Clear"?: A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v.
Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 265-66 (1998) (arguing that a
"lenient" reading of Gregory yields two conditions that must be met in order to satisfy
the plain statement rule: (1) the plain meaning of the statutory language includes the
core state function at issue; and (2) that there is no exception in the statute which
creates ambiguity regarding whether the core function was meant to be included); The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 202 (1991) [here-
inafter Leading Cases] (claiming that Gregory created a "two-tier" inquiry: (1) Con-
gress must abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to have its legislation
apply to the states generally; and (2) Congress must then also clearly state which state
governmental functions it intends the law to include).
175. Justices Blackmun and Marshall dissented because "the structure and legisla-
tive history of the policymaker exclusion make clear that judges are not the kind of
policymakers whom Congress intended to exclude from the ADEA's broad reach."
501 U.S. Gregory at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent further stated that
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the application of a statute to core state functions by requiring specific
statements of Eleventh Amendment abrogation. This practice, how-
ever, may contradict. other constitutional principals, particularly when
applied to legislation passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
a. Textualism and Its Limited Sources for Determining
Congressional Intent
One significant effect of Atascadero's176 clear statement rule is to
limit the search for congressional intent to the explicit language of the
statute.177 Prior to Atascadero, the Court had found congressional in-
tent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by looking at both the text
and legislative history. 17  Post-Atascadero, the Court's plain state-
ment rule reflects a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, be-
cause the Court requires the intent to abrogate to be clear from
"unmistakable language in the statute itself."'17 9
As explained above, in Gregory v. Ashcroft the Court further ex-
tended the reach of the plain statement rule.1s° This extension poten-
tially implements a textualist method of interpretation on the question
of whether Congress intended to abrogate states' immunity as to a
specific state function.' 8' Thus, the Eleventh Amendment plain state-
ment rule has, in essence, been transformed into a two-pronged test
for cases dealing with what is perceived to be a "core state function."
First, under the Atascadero prong, the court asks whether Congress
intended to generally abrogate the states immunity. Next, if the court
finds Gregory's version of the plain statement rule applicable, it asks
whether Congress intended to abrogate states' immunity as applied to
specific areas of state governance. This transformation has greater
consequences than the plain statement rule's original incarnation in
Atascadero.'8 As seen with the amendment to the Rehab Act, Con-
gress can fairly easily satisfy prong one by inserting the necessary lan-
when a "statutory term is ambiguous or undefined, a court ... should defer to a
reasonable interpretation of that term proffered by the agency entrusted with ad-
ministering the statute." Id. at 493 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
176. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
177. Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1959.
178. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
179. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243. Four years later in Dellnutth v. Muth, the Court
said:
Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into
whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Con-
gress' intention is 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute'...
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary;... because by definition
the rule of Atascadero will not be met.
491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242).
180. See supra Part llI.A.2.
181. See Leading Cases, supra note 174, at 202-04.
182. See Lee, supra note 174, at 266-67.
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guage when needed to abrogate state immunity generally. 183 It is an
entirely different matter, however, if to satisfy prong two, Congress
has to explicitly enumerate every state function covered by a statute.
Either Congress will have to anticipate all areas likely to be labeled
"core state functions" or amend the statute every time a court so
determines. 184
The problem is compounded, moreover, by the Court's use of textu-
alism on the abrogation question.'85 Thus, when determining whether
Congress intended a statute to apply to what is arguably a core state
function, the Gregory decision may bar consideration of legislative
history, the structure of the statute, and the statutory purpose, as a
means to discern congressional intent for specific questions of statu-
tory application. How textualism may result in a misinterpretation of
congressional intent is illustrated by the Court's use of the plain state-
ment rule in Atascadero to determine whether the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity was abrogated generally. Had the Court been
looking for congressional intent in Atascadero, using ordinary tools of
statutory interpretation--legislative history in particular-the Court
would likely have found an intent to abrogate. After looking at this
kind of evidence, both the lower court in Atascadero86 and Justice
Brennan in dissent'87 concluded that Congress intended to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Even more convincing
are the later statements made by members of Congress when passing
the amendment to the Rehab Act. Members of Congress specifically
commented on how the Court, by focusing on the text of the statute,
had misinterpreted congressional intent. 88
183. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
184. See Lee, supra note 174, at 266 (stating that the negative consequences of re-
quiring specific enumeration are (1) wasted legislative resources; (2) "legislative pa-
ralysis" due to "the impracticality" of drafting lists of state functions; (3) the
unwillingness of courts to find anything a core state function unless it is explicitly
listed as covered by the statute; and (4) increased inflexibility of statutes and in-
creased difficulty in adapting statutes to changing circumstances).
185. See Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 17, at 1960.
186. By relying on Supreme Court precedent, the lower court in Atascadero in-
ferred that the states were included in the authorization of a general class of defend-
ants, as the Rehab Act "contains extensive provisions under which states are the
express intended recipients of federal assistance." Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp.,
735 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
187. In Atascadero, Brennan found congressional intent to abrogate by examining
legislative history, the text, and Senate-approved regulations which defined "recipi-
ent" to include state and local governments. 473 U.S. at 249-51.
188. S. Conf. Rep. No. 99-388, at 27-28 (1986) ("The Supreme Court's decision mis-
interpreted congressional intent. Such a gap in Section 504 coverage was never in-
tended. It would be inequitable for Section 504 to mandate state compliance.., and
yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal courts .... ); 132 Cong.
Rec. 28,623 (Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("These provisions would
reverse the holding in Atascadero by providing that ... a Federal suit for damages
would now be available against a state or a State agency."). Similar statements were
also made regarding the Court's decision in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989),
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b. The Eleventh Amendment Plain Statement Rule and the
Fourteenth Amendment
The ADA, an anti-discriminatory statute, was enacted pursuant to
Congress's authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment' 89 and should be interpreted broadly to accomplish its remedial
purposes. 190 Yet this principle collides with the Eleventh Amend-
ment's limit on Congress's power to provide for a private remedy for
that Congress, in enacting the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-
1491 (1994), did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See H.
Rep. No. 101-544, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723-34 ("The Com-
mittee has determined that the Supreme Court misinterpreted congressional intent
.... It would be inequitable for EHA to mandate State compliance with its provi-
sions and yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in Federal courts when
State or State agency actions are at issue.").
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) ("It is the purpose of this chapter... to invoke
the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities."). Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the states from "abridg[ing] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; ... depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process
of law; ... [ ]or deny[ing] to any person ... equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Section five grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. The Four-
teenth Amendment--"specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an
intrusion on state sovereignty"-shifted the enforcement and definition of civil rights
from the states to the federal government. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 179 (1980).
The Supreme Court refused to give individuals with disabilities protected class sta-
tus in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Protected class
status means that the court will judge the legitimacy of a law with varying degrees of
scrutiny depending on the classifications the legislature used. Nowak & Rotunda,
supra note 116, § 14.3, at 601-06. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, even though at that time the
Court had not yet found gender to be a protected class under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court found that Congress, through section five's grant of authority, had
the power to create a statutorily protected class. See 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Six
months later, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court found that gender
classifications merited "intermediate scrutiny," thereby making gender a constitution-
ally protected class. In the ADA, Congress appropriated language from the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence to describe the discrimination faced by indi-
viduals with disabilities as a class and made explicit findings in the ADA which sug-
gest that individuals with disabilities are entitled to suspect class status under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (7) (1994).
Currently, however, the lower courts disagree about whether the ADA is a valid
use of Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Crawford v.
Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481,487 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the Seminole
test and finding that the ADA was created to remedy discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment), and Clark v. California, 123 F3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997)
(same), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686), with
Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that the ADA was not
a valid use of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power because the ADA demands
"special treatment ... and entitlement in order to achieve its goals"), aff'd per curiam,
131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 10, 1998) (No. 97-8246).
190. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (stating that it is a "familiar
canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly
to effectuate its purposes").
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states' civil rights violations. The Supreme Court recently addressed
the interaction of the two Amendments in Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida.191 The Court reiterated the Atascadero test to determine whether
a statute abrogated a states Eleventh Amendment immunity: "[W]e
ask . . . first, whether Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its in-
tent to abrogate the immunity,"' and added "second, whether Con-
gress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power."'192 On the
second question, the court held that Congress lacked the power to
abrogate pursuant to its Article I powers,193 and indicated that Con-
gress's only source of authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
is the Fourteenth Amendment. 194 This proposition reaffirmed Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer,'95 where the Court held that as legislation passed pursu-
ant to Congress's section five power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 abrogated
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 196 The Court said: "When
Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative au-
thority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amend-
ment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on
state authority."'197 Thus, the Court has recognized that it is contradic-
tory to allow states to assert their sovereign immunity and limit the
reach of legislation passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment
whose very purpose is to expand federal authority over the states.' 98
The presumption that such remedial legislation should be interpreted
broadly aids anti-discriminatory legislation like the ADA in effectuat-
ing its goals. A textualist version of the Gregory plain statement rule,
however-would contradict both the purpose of the legislation and
the presumption that it is to be interpreted generously-because it
would limit the reach of statute to only those core functions enumer-
ated in a statute enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
191. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
192. Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 72-73 (stating that Article I powers "cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction").
194. Id. at 65; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not As Limits, But As Em-
powerment, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1219, 1222 (1997) ("[Iln Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits ... against states pursuant
to federal laws except for those adopted under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 6 ("Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion reaffirmed that
Congress does have power, when legislating under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to abrogate sovereign immunity and thus subject states to federal court
suits, the Court ruled that Congress lacks such power when acting under its Article I
grant of legislative authority.").
195. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).





Were it not for Gregory, it would seem that Congress used both the
language and the authority necessary to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment in the ADA-in accordance with Atascadero and Semi-
nole. The application of the Gregory rule remains an active debate
within the Supreme Court, however.19 9 Picking up on the Supreme
Court's internal dispute, it is Gregory's version of the plain statement
rule that defendant prisons use to challenge the ADA's application to
state prisons.20 The prisons argue that prison management is a core
state function, and that Gregory requires specific abrogation of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity in order to permit private suits in federal
court for violations of the ADA which occur in prison.
B. The Chevron2 0 1 Doctrine
The ADA delegates much of the fleshing-out of the statute to ad-
ministrative agencies, including the DOJ which has the authority
under Title II to promulgate regulations regarding the application of
199. The Court has applied the Gregory plain statement rule only once in a five-
four decision. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994). On the ques-
tion of whether a provision of the federal bankruptcy law meant to adopt or displace
state law, the Court found the language of the statute inconclusive. Id. The Court's
holding relied on two presumptions: (1) that statutes invading common law must be
read to favor long-established principles absent evident statutory purpose to the con-
trary; and (2) in this case, the Gregory-enhanced version of the clear statement rule
required clearer congressional intent to preempt. Il at 543-45.
Dissenting justices have argued for the application of the Gregory plain statement
rule in four instances, claiming core state interests were implicated. See United States
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,879 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opin-
ion joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.) (citing to Gregory to support
the argument that states have the power to set additional qualifications, like term
limits, for their elected officials over what the Constitution requires); City of Ed-
monds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 743-44 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(opinion joined by Scalia & Kennedy, JJ.) (citing to Gregory to support the statement
that zoning laws are areas traditionally regulated by the states); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292-93 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opin-
ion joined by Scalia, J.) (citing to Gregory to argue that the Federal Arbitration Act
does not apply to state courts); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 291-92 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & Scalia. J.) (arguing that
the Gregory plain statement rule mandates a narrow construction of the Hobbs Act to
include the common-law definition of extortion by public officials). The Court has
also cited to Gregory in other cases for its general federalism propositions. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365,2376 (1997) (citing to Gregory for the proposi-
tion that the Constitution established a system of "'dual sovereignty"); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment pre-
vents the federal government from "commandeering" state governments).
200. See e.g., Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Sers., 126
F.3d 589, 607 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Gregory plain statement rule bars the
ADA's application to state prisons), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S.
Dec. 19, 1997) (No. 97-1113); Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344-46 (4th Cir.
1995) (suggesting that the Gregory plain statement rule prohibits the application of
the ADA to state prisons).
201. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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the ADA to public entities. The Chevron doctrine reflects principles
regarding the appropriate roles of the judicial and executive branches
for interpreting statutory language. Chevron sets up a two-step stan-
dard to establish the appropriate amount of deference a court should
give an agency interpretation of a statute.2°  As with the Eleventh
Amendment plain statement rule, the conclusions that the reviewing
court reaches at each step depend on statutory interpretation, thereby
raising the question whether another method would lead to a different
conclusion.
1. The Court, Agencies, and the Chevron Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron created a new doctrine of
statutory interpretation.2 °3 The rule of Chevron requires a court to
defer to an administrative agency's "reasonable" interpretation of a
gap or ambiguity in the statute under which the agency has express
lawmaking authority.0 4 In applying Chevron, the court must go
through two steps. First, it must ask whether "Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress."' 20 5 If Congress's intent is not clear because the statute is silent
or ambiguous on the particular issue, the Court must defer to the
agency's interpretation of the statute if it is "permissible," and does
not conflict with the statutory language.20 6 The agency's interpreta-
tion will be deemed permissible "[w]hen Congress expressly delegates
to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy de-
terminations,... unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
202. Id. at 842-43.
203. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 623-25 (1996) ("Chev-
ron adopted a generic norm of construction, a new default presumption that Congress
implicitly assigns agencies authority to resolve ambiguities in the statutes the agencies
administer. Chevron therefore significantly revised the interpretive background
against which Congress legislates."). The doctrine states that: "When a challenge to
an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers
on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
204. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
205. Id. at 842-43. This prong of the Chevron rule, therefore, parallels the plain
statement rule in that both the plain statement rule and the Chevron step-one ques-
tion ask whether or not the statutory language is clear. See supra notes 124-48 and
accompanying text.
206. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take 7lvo:




trary to the statute."' 7 This includes when Congress purposefully
leaves a "gap for the agency to fill."'2es
One practical basis for the Chevron rule is an agency's expertise;
due to the agency's greater experience in what can be the highly tech-
nical and specialized nature of regulation, the court should refrain
from substituting its judgement for that of the agency.2' Another jus-
tification for the Chevron doctrine's deference to interpretations by an
administrative agency is the agency's greater political accountability,
especially as compared to unelected judges.210 The Court recognized
that ambiguous statutory language requires a choice between inter-
pretations, a discretionary exercise better suited to accountable agen-
cies.211 The Chevron doctrine further presumes that Congress, by
expressly delegating rulemaking power, intended for the agency to be
responsible for discerning the policy choices reflected in the statutory
language and for choosing between competing interests.212 Thus,
Chevron reconciles the complexity of the modern administrative state
with the constitutional commitment to the electoral accountability of
policymakers.213
207. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994) (quoting Chevron,
467 U.S. at 844).
208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Such a gap has been described as a direction to
"promulgate regulations [to] transform[ ] the generalities [of a statute] into specifics."
Russell L. Weaver, Some Realisin About Chevron, 58 Mo. L Rev. 129, 134 (1993). It
has been argued, however, that the theory that Congress has, by leaving a gap or
ambiguity, implicitly delegated the authority to the agency is a -fiction." Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L Rev. 363, 370
(1986) [hereinafter, Breyer, Judicial Review].
209. See Breyer, Judicial Review, supra note 208, at 368; Schacter, supra note 7, at
615. The "deferential" model was earlier articulated in NLRB r. Hearst Publications,
Inc, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), where the Court relied on the agency's interpretation of a
broad statutory term because "its experience in the administration of the statute gives
it familiarity." 322 U.S. at 130 (citing Grey v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941)).
210. Manning, supra note 203, at 626 (claiming that "Chevron makes sense of origi-
nal constitutional commitments to electoral accountability by presuming that Con-
gress has selected agencies rather than courts to resolve serious ambiguities in agency-
administered statutes"); Merrill, supra note 18, at 978-79; Schacter, supra note 7, at
617. Although agency officials themselves are not elected, they are appointed and
supervised by the President, and Congress has the power to veto regulations with
which it disagrees. See Merrill, supra note 18, at 978; see also Eskridge & Frickey,
Cases and Materials, supra note 9, at 495-96 (discussing legislative vetoes).
211. Manning, supra note 203, at 625.
212. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Mank, supra note 95, at 1278-84 (arguing
that agencies are better equipped than courts to interpret statutes because agencies
have a closer relationship to the political branches and legislative process); Sunstein,
Law and Administration, supra note 8, at 2088 (stating that "Chevron reflects a[n] ...
understanding that... judgements of policy.., should be made by administrators
rather than judges").
213. Manning, supra note 203, at 626.
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2. The Effect of Textualism On the Chevron Doctrine
Because step one of the Chevron doctrine requires the court to de-
cide whether the text is ambiguous, and thus whether or not to defer
to the agency's regulations, the choice of interpretive method can
have a dramatic effect upon the manner in which a statute is imple-
mented. For example, if the court is looking to the legislative history
to determine whether Congress clearly spoke to a very specific issue,
it is not likely to find such intent because Congress usually expects
agencies to address narrow issues implicated by the statute.2 14 If the
court looks at the statutory language, without considering the policies
and the congressional purpose behind it, the court can decide, without
the aid of a statute's context, what constitutes the "ordinary meaning"
of the words, and therefore disregard the agency's interpretation.1 5
Textualism ends the inquiry once the court finds that a term has a
"plain meaning. '216 In contrast, by using intentionalism, the court
may find an ambiguity as to the meaning of a statutory term, not be-
cause the term is itself unclear, but because it is unclear how Congress
intended the word to be understood in the larger context of the statu-
tory purpose.2 17 Such a determination would trigger the Chevron rule
and require a court to defer to agency interpretations. In practice,
because the Justices disagree on what tools of statutory interpretation
to use to determine whether congressional intent is clear or not, the
Court has applied Chevron irregularly. 18
Originally, the Court used an intentionalist approach to discern
whether Congress had spoken to a particular issue.219 The Court,
however, has transformed the original Chevron question of whether
Congress had "specific intentions on" or "clearly spoken to" a statu-
tory issue into a question of whether the statutory language was "am-
biguous, ' '220 or whether it had a "plain meaning. ' '12  Previously, the
214. See Merrill, supra note 18, at 991.
215. Scalia, supra note 110, at 521.
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent
from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less
often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus
relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation
which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
Id.
216. Merrill, supra note 18, at 991-92.
217. See id. at 991.
218. See Weaver, supra note 208, at 154.
219. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 975-84 (1986) (applying
an intentionalist version of the Chevron step-one question to find that Congress did
not unambiguously express its intent regarding the FDA's discretion in setting toler-
ance levels for substances added to foods); Merrill, supra note 18, at 990-92 (tracking
the shift in how the Court has articulated the step-one ambiguity question).
220. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-30, 236-43 (1994) (ap-
plying a textualist version of the Chevron question and finding that the statutory term
"modify" was not sufficiently ambiguous to defer to FCC regulations, thereby disre-
garding both conflicting dictionary definitions of the term and a provision allowing
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Court looked for an indication of congressional intent on the specific
issue and if none existed, permitted an agency's reasonable interpreta-
tion to prevail. Now the Court will only defer to an agency's interpre-
tation if no other possible construction of the statute will yield an
answer to the issue before the court. This shift mirrors the Court's
internal disagreement over what interpretive tools to use; whether the
Court interprets the statutory language with the aid of legislative his-
tory depends on whose view gains the majority.'
the FCC to "modify" its regulations in response to changes in the industry); Pierce,
Hypertextualism, supra note 98, at 754-56 (listing cases from the 1993-94 Term that
exemplify this shift from intentionalism to what Pierce calls "hypertexualism").
221. See Merrill, supra note 18, at 990-91; see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S.
281, 291 (1988) (describing the Chevron step-one question as an inquiry into the
"plain meaning of the statute").
222. Exemplifying the debate between the methods of statutory interpretation are
two Supreme Court decisions, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511
U.S. 328 (1994), and Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore-
gon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). In City of Chicago, the Court addressed the question of
whether a regulation promulgated under Section 3000(i) of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act properly defined hazardous waste to exclude ash generated by an exempted
household waste facility. 511 U.S. at 330-32. Justice Scalia, for the majority, rejected
the Solicitor General's "plea for deference to the EPA's interpretation" of the statute
and rejected consideration of the legislative history which included a statement that
the "generation" of waste was intended to be exempted. Id. at 337-39. Instead, by
looking only to the "plain meaning" of the statutory language, the Court held that the
ash generated by the facility was not exempt from regulation as a hazardous waste. Id.
at 334-35. Justice Stevens dissented, however, arguing that the "relevant statutory
text is not as unambiguous as the Court asserts," and, moreover, that the legislative
history supported the EPA's conclusion. Id. at 346-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens further stated that this was a "question[ ] of policy that we are not competent
to resolve. [This] question[] [is] precisely the kind that Congress has directed the
EPA to answer." Id at 348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One year later in Sweet Home, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, and Justice
Scalia dissented, tracking their previous disagreement in City of Chicago. The Court
upheld a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) that defined the statutory term "harm" to include "signifi-
cant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife."
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690-92. Finding that the statutory language of the ESA was
ambiguous, and that the agency had latitude in enforcing the ESA according to its
expertise, the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation. Id. at 703. Dissenting,
Justice Scalia argued that it was inappropriate to resort to legislative history when
"the enacted text was as clear as this," id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and that
"legislative history [cannot] be summoned forth to contradict, rather than clarify,
what is in its totality an unambiguous statutory text." Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
These two cases highlight the breadth of the inconsistent applications of Chevron.
They are inconsistent because a different method of interpretation is applied in each
case to Chevron's step-one question regarding whether the statutory text is ambigu-
ous on how Congress intended the statute to apply to the specific issue before the
court. Whether the language was found ambiguous depended on how much weight, if
any, Justices were willing to give non-textual information and concerns. Justice Ste-
vens, using intentionalism, looked to the larger statutory context, and both times ad-
vocated deferring to the agency regulation. Justice Scalia used textualism and focused
on the plain language of the statute, both times finding an unambiguous statutory
meaning different from that found by the agency.
2262 [Vol. 66
DISABILITIES ACT & STATE PRISONS
This disagreement regarding how to determine ambiguity under
step-one of the Chevron doctrine 223 is reflected in the lower court de-
cisions that find the ADA applies to state prisons: Some defer to the
DOJ regulations, while other courts do not. Even though the only
question before these courts is whether a state prison is a covered
entity under the ADA, the courts that do not defer to the regulations
express doubt about the wisdom of applying the ADA to state prisons
and whether Congress intended to extend this right to prisoners. The
next part examines how courts that find the statutory text of the ADA
ambiguous-either on the question of whether Congress intended to
abrogate the states' immunity for state prisons, or under step-one of
the Chevron doctrine-could find guidance in the ADA's purpose and
the regulations promulgated under it.
IV. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER WHETHER THE ADA APPLIES
TO STATE PRISONS
Despite the clarity of the language of Title II of the ADA"24 and
despite the pre-existing Rehab Act case law2 2 5 and regulations,2 2 6 Six
circuit courts disagree about whether the ADA applies to state pris-
223. Within the context of the ADA, courts currently disagree regarding whether to
apply a textualist or an intentionalist interpretive method to the text. On whether the
ADA creates liability for architects, the district court in United States v. Ellerbe
Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997), held that the DOJ regulation and
interpretation of the ADA finding liability for architects was consistent with the "re-
medial purpose of the ADA" and "entitled to deference." Id. at 1266. The court
based its decision on legislative history and the statutory purpose and further said that
had congressional intent not been clear, it would have deferred, following Chevron.
Id. at 1266-67 & n.4. In contrast, the court in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Ellerbe
Becket Architects & Eng'rs, P.C., 945 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), affd 117 F.3d 579
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998), found that the "plain language of
the statute makes clear that architects are not covered by . the ADA." Id. at 2
(emphasis added).
On the issue of whether the ADA applies to local zoning laws, the court in Innova-
tive Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), held
that the text, purpose, and legislative history all "confirms that it was intended to
sweep widely." Id. at 232. Furthermore, the DOJ regulations, which interpreted the
ADA to reach "all actions by public entities, including zoning enforcement actions,"
were entitled to deference pursuant to Chevron. Id. at 232 & n.3. The court in United
States v. City of Charlotte, 904 F. Supp. 482 (W.D.N.C. 1995), however, found the
statutory language of the ADA to be "unambiguous," in that it did not encompass
zoning decisions, and to find that it did "would stretch [the] meaning[ ] beyond sensi-
ble proportion." Id. at 484. Consequently, the court did not reach the question of
whether to defer to the regulations.
224. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
Rehab Act applies to prisons); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);
Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (same), affd 941 F.2d 1495
(11th Cir. 1991); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. W.Va. 1976) (same).
226. 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(d)(1)(ii) (1997) (providing procedure for inmate claims
under the Rehab Act); id. § 42.540(h) (using "department of corrections" as an exam-
ple of a "program" under the Rehab Act); id. § 42.5400) (defining "benefit" under
the Rehab Act as including a "disposition" such as "confinement").
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ons. This disagreement revolves around a doctrinal conflict over
whether to consider this question as one involving Eleventh Amend-
ment abrogation or one triggering Chevron deference to administra-
tive interpretation.
All of the courts that have considered the issue agree that in the
ADA Congress has met the requirements of the Atascadero plain
statement rule and abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity-at least generally.' 7 They disagree, however, on whether the
Gregory plain statement rule, requiring specific abrogation on core
state functions, applies to the question of whether the ADA applies to
state prisons. Additionally, the courts holding that the ADA applies
to state prisons vary in their application of Chevron, and the extent to
which the ADA covers prison operations.
This part first looks at the decisions that concluded that the Gregory
plain statement rule bars the application of the ADA to state prisons.
It then compares the decisions that found Gregory inapplicable and
held that the ADA does apply to state prisons with respect to their
application of the Chevron doctrine. Finally, this part examines how
the courts' analyses reflect consideration of the unique circumstances
that arise in prisons.
A. How Courts Rely on Gregory v. Ashcroft and Textualism to
Conclude that the ADA Does Not Apply to State Prisons
Until the Fourth Circuit's 1995 decision, Torcasio v. Mturray,'8 no
court had questioned the applicability of the ADA to prisons on Elev-
enth Amendment grounds, '9 and courts had previously held that the
Rehab Act applied to state prisons that received federal funds.23n The
Torcasio court proposed that the broad, all-inclusive language of the
ADA did not include prisons, and it reached its decision by applying
the Gregory plain statement rule." 1 Since Torcasio, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correc-
tional Services, 32 again found that the "profound consequences" of
227. See, e.g., Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Sers., 126
F.3d 589, 604 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the ADA contains general abrogation of
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3474
(U.S. Dec. 19, 1997) (No. 97-1113); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118
F.3d 168, 172-73 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
228. 57 F.3d 1340, 1344 (4th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that the ADA does not apply to
state prisons).
229. See Laura E. Walvoord, A Critique of Torcasio v. Murray and the Use of the
Clear Statement Rule to Interpret the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 Minn. L. Rev.
1183, 1217 (1996) (calling the Torcasio court's analysis "unprecedented").
230. See, e.g., Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 560-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Bonner, a deaf inmate, had stated a claim under the Rehab Act for not being pro-
vided with American Sign Language interpreters or communication devices while in-
carcerated in a state prison which received federal funds).
231. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344-45.
232. 126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997).
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holding prisons to the requirements of the ADA and Rehab Act de-
mand that Congress "speak with unmistakable clarity," and held that
Congress had not done So. 23
3
The courts in Amos2 14 and Callaway v. Smith County235 conducted
the most comprehensive analyses in support of their positions that the
233. Amos, 126 F.3d at 600. Lower courts in the Fourth and other circuits have
followed suit holding that the ADA does not apply to state prisoners. See Callaway v.
Smith County, No. CIV.A.6:97 CV834, 1998 WL 25627 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1998);
Boblett v. Angelone, 957 F. Supp. 808 (W.D. Va. 1997); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp.
932, (E.D. N.C. 1996), affd per curiam, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Mar. 10, 1998) (No. 97-8246).
Previously, the Tenth Circuit, in Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991),
and more recently in White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364 (10th Cir. 1996), gave little
weight to the larger anti-discriminatory policies behind the ADA and the Rehab Act.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit narrowly interpreted both statutes to find that "em-
ployee" does not include prisoners working in prison and, more surprisingly, that pris-
ons are not "programs or activities." Williams, 926 F.2d at 997; see also White, 82 F.3d
367 (explaining-solely by referencing Williams-that the ADA does not apply to
prisons). Whether an inmate is an "employee" is a consideration under Title I of the
ADA, whereas whether prisons are a "public entity" is a Title II question. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12131 (1994). The Tenth Circuit does not make this distinction, See
White, 82 F.3d at 367 (explaining that "prison employment situations" are not covered
under the ADA because the Williams court found that prisoners were not employees
under the ADA). Prison employment situations, however, should be analyzed under
Title II coverage of "programs" of any public entity, not under Title I, which covers
employment practices. Courts have held that prisoners are not "employees" entitled
to either the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), see Nicas-
tro v. Reno, 84 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1992), or the protections of the "whistleblower" provisions of the Clean Air Act and
the Toxic Substance Control Act, Coupar v. Department of Labor, 105 F.3d 1263 (9th
Cir. 1997). In Coupar, the court distinguished the prisoner-prison work relationship
from that of other employee-employer relationships, saying "the economic reality of
the relationship between the worker and the entity for which work was performed lies
in the relationship between the prison and the prisoner. It is penological, not pecuni-
ary." Id. at 1265 & n.1 (citing Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (en
banc). Similar analysis should have led the court in Williams to find that prison em-
ployment is covered by Title II of the ADA, as part of the prison program provided
by the state.
234. The Amos plaintiffs alleged a range of discriminatory practices, including de-
nial of participation in a work-release program, and the inaccessibility of bathrooms,
athletic facilities, and food services. Amos, 126 F.3d at 590-91. In examining the
Fourth Circuit's argument, this Note primarily relies on that court's decision in Amos
for two reasons. First, in Torcasio, the issue of whether prisons are covered by the
ADA was not before the court and its opinion on the matter is dicta. See Amos, 126
F.3d at 593. Second, the Amos opinion literally adopts the Torcasio opinion almost in
its entirety before going on to make its own very similar argument. See Amos, 126
F.3d at 594 ("[W]e begin our analysis with a full statement of what we decided in
[Torcasio].").
235. No. Civ.A.6 CV834, 1998 WL 25627 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1998). The Callaway
court did not specify the ADA claim involved in Callaway, but the inmate alleged
generally unfair treatment because of his HIV positive status. Id. at *1-2. Although
the plaintiff in Callaway alleged inadequate medical treatment and the other cases
were concerned with questions of access, the Callaway court analyzed the issues in the
same manner. This is notable given that the question of whether infection with the
HIV virus is a "disability" under the ADA is an open question, which the Supreme
Court will resolve this Term. Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (lst Cir. 1997)
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ADA does not apply to state prisons. Although they found that the
ADA contains a general abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendmentimmunity, they questioned whether Congress intended that abroga-
tion to give prisoners the right to sue states for violations of the
ADA.1 6 The Amos court acknowledged the ADA's language of ab-
rogation, but found that it only "suggests that Congress intended for
[the ADA] to apply to states generally," not that Congress intended
for prisons to be covered under the ADA.2- The court specifically
adopted the Gregory Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule to
determine "whether the statute applies in the particular matter
claimed."" 8 To apply the Gregory plain statement rule, there must be
ambiguity in the statutory language as to whether Congress intended
to abrogate on the specific question at issue.3 9 The Amos court said
that when the statutory language is so broad, "the breadth of [it] ren-
ders it ambiguous. We therefore decline to attribute to Congress an
intent to intrude on a core state function in the face of statutory ambi-
guity.' 24° As stated by the Callaway court: "[Tihe issue here is...
whether the sweep of the statute necessarily encompasses... prisons,
a core function of state government, absent a clear and plain state-
ment by Congress ... .,"241 The courts found that prison management
is an "area of historic state control,"242 "a core function uniquely
within the authority of the State, ' 243 an area particularly unsuited to
the interference of the federal judiciary, 2 " and to apply the ADA and
Rehab Act to prisons would alter the "usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government. 245 In concluding
(holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under the ADA), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997) (mem.), with Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV infection was not dis-
abled under the ADA).
236. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 604-05; Callaway, 1998 WL 25627, at *3.
237. Amos, 126 F.3d at 604.
238. Id. (quoting Riley v. Virginia Dep't of Educ., 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997),
superceded by IDEA Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612. 111 Stat. 37,60
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (West Supp. 1998)) (citing Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
239. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
240. Amos, 126 F.3d at 605.
241. Callaway, 1998 WL 25627, at *6.
242. Amos, 126 F.3d at 600.
243. Callaway, 1998 WL 25627, at *7.
244. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1995). Consider also the
sentiments behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-134, 110
Stat., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1321, 1321-66 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626
(West Supp. 1998), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West Supp. 1998), and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(e)
(West Supp. 1998)), which drastically limits inmates' access to the courts and the relief
they may receive. See generally, Catherine G. Patsos, The Constitutionality and Impli-
cations of the Prison Litigation Refor Act, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L Rev. 205 (1998) (re-
viewing the provisions of the PLRA and arguing that it is unconstitutional).
245. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985))); see Callaway, 1998 WL 25627, at *7.
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that the Torcasio decision was sound, the Amos court stated: "Most
importantly, Torcasio recognized the profound consequences that
would result if the [ADA and Rehab Act] were applied to state
prisons. "246
Perhaps acknowledging that the Gregory plain statement rule did
not require the statute to include a list of every core state function
Congress intended it to cover, but only to make it "plain, ' 47 the
Amos and Callaway courts looked to the statutory language. On the
question of whether Congress intended to abrogate the states' immu-
nity as to state prisons, the Amos court took a textualist approach to
the statutory language248 and invoked textualism's search for the "or-
dinary meaning. '249 In particular, the court argued that because pris-
oners are involuntarily incarcerated, they are not covered by the
ADA, 2 ° because Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against
individuals with disabilities who meet the "eligibility requirements...
for the participation in programs or activities."2'' The Amos court in-
terpreted those terms to inherently "imply voluntariness on the part
of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the state; they do not bring
to mind prisoners who are being held against their will. '252 The Cal-
laway court similarly reasoned "that inasmuch as prisoners are not
voluntarily 'participating' in the prison routine, they are not qualified
individuals within the meaning of the Act. '25 3 The Callaway court
also argued that Title II of the ADA cannot apply to prisons because
the statute refers to "'[p]ublic Services' and speaks of bans on discrim-
ination in services provided to the public, but the public is excluded
246. Amos, 126 F.3d at 600. The court finds that applying the ADA to state prisons
will have two consequences that support its decision that Congress did not intend
prisons to be covered. First, application of the ADA "would have serious implications
for the management of state prisons, in matters ranging from cell construction and
modification, to inmate assignment, to scheduling, to security problems." Id. (quoting
Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1346 (4th Cir. 1995)). The second and related con-
cern is that holding that the ADA applies to state prisons would involve the federal
judiciary in managing and overseeing state prison operations. Id. at 595 ("[Albsent
the most extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not to immerse themselves in
the management of state prisons or to substitute their judgement for that of trained
penological authorities charged with the administration of such facilities." (quotations
and citations omitted)).
247. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991).
248. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text for the language of Title II of the
ADA.
249. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
250. Amos, 126 F.3d at 596, 601 (citing Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
252. Amos, 126 F.3d at 601 (quoting Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th
Cir. 1995)). As noted by a different court, however, the ADA is uncontroversially
assumed to cover other compulsory state programs and benefits, like public educa-
tion. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert.
filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686).
253. Callaway v. Smith County, No. Civ.A.6 CV834, 1998 WL 25627, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 21, 1998).
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from prisons." 4 Further, the Callaway court noted "the absurdity of
defining 'benefit' in such a broad and general way as to include sen-
tencing and confinement." 5
The plaintiffs argued that the court should not apply the Gregoty
plain statement rule, and because the court found that the statute con-
tained gaps and ambiguities, the court should have followed Chevron
and deferred to the regulations. The Amos and Callaway courts both
found that federalism counseled against deference to the regulations.
The Amos court responded that it found the regulations to be "min-
ute" in detail, "byzantine," "intricate[ ]," "intrusive[ I," and to "con-
sume" pages of the Code of Federal Regulations.2s5' Essentially, the
court used the depth and detail of guidance on how the ADA would
affect prison services, construction, and design to conclude that state
prisons are the type of core state function that required the court to be
"absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise." '  The
Callaway court also found that federalism was implicated by the de-
tailed regulations, and to give ambiguous federal law "state-displacing
weight" on the basis of agency regulations would be to avoid the very
political process Garcia said should protect the states against "intru-
sive exercises" of Congress's powers.258
B. The Reasoning of the Courts that Find the ADA Applies to
State Prisons
The Third, 9 Seventh,26 and Ninth 61 Circuits have upheld the ap-
plication of the ADA and the Rehab Act to state prisons, and the
254. Id at *4.
255. Id. at *7.
256. 126 F.3d at 606.
257. Id. at 605 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)).
258. 1998 WL 25627, at *7 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)).
259. See Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997)
(finding that the ADA applies to prisons), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
Prior to Yeskey, the Third Circuit had held that the ADA applied to state prisons, but
withdrew that opinion because rehearing en banc was granted and the opinion va-
cated. Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 93 F.3d 1124 (3d Cir. 1996),
vacated and withdrawn, No. 95-3402, 1996 WL 474106 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 1996). Due to
the confusion, the court in Rouse v. Plantier, 987 F. Supp. 302 (D.N.J. 1997), held that
the application of the ADA to state prisons was not sufficiently clear and granted
qualified immunity to state prison officials.
260. See Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997)
(finding that the ADA applies to prisons); Love v. Westville Correctional Ctr., 103
F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1996) (assuming the ADA applies to state prisons); Hanson v. San-
gamon County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 97-3175, 1998 WL 34773 (C.D. 11. Jan. 28, 1998)
(holding that the ADA applies to state prisons).
261. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (explicitly joining the
Third and Seventh Circuits in finding that both the ADA and the Rehab Act apply to
prisons), petition for cerL filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686);
Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), petition for cert. filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 97-686); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that both the Rehab Act and the ADA apply to prisons). Gates v.
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Sixth,262 Eleventh,63 and Eighth264 have assumed without discussion
that those statutes do apply. All recognized that the purpose of the
ADA is to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability, and that
this right to be free from discrimination is "among the few rights that
prisoners do not park at the prison gates. '265 They unanimously agree
that Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
and that Gregory is inapplicable,266 because its holding was limited to
"core state functions" related to government representation and close
analogies, a category that does not include state prisons, 267 a "mere
provision of public services. ' 268 Further, as a matter of statutory con-
struction, the decision to apply the plain statement rule in Gregory
was premised on the ambiguity regarding whether the statutory excep-
tion for policymakers included judges.2 69 The Yeskey court, for exam-
ple, found the ADA and Rehab Act to "speak unambiguously of their
application to state and local governments. '270 Therefore, in holding
that the ADA does apply to state prisons, these opinions focused on
both the extent and manner of the application of the ADA to state
prisons, and on the exact contours of the right afforded to prisoners.
The courts' methods of statutory interpretation, particularly regarding
whether they apply the Chevron doctrine and consider the agency reg-
ulations in their analysis, vary. First this section will examine the
method of statutory interpretation used by the courts which did apply
Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Rehab Act applies to pris-
ons); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
262. Wagner v. Jett, No. 94-5522, 1994 WL 532930 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994) (holding
that the plaintiff inmate did not state a claim under the ADA, without discussing
whether the ADA applied to state prisons).
263. Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that prisoners
can state a claim under the Rehab Act), vacated and reh'g granted, 133 F.3d 1377
(11th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522 n.41 (11th Cir. 1991) (same).
264. Aswegan v. Bruhl, 113 F.3d 109 (8th Cir.) (holding that cable television in
prison is not a "public service, program, or activity" under the ADA), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 383 (1997); Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
Rehab Act applies to prisons).
265. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 486; see also Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Correc-
tions, 118 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Crawford, 115 F.3d at 486), cert.
granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998); see Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F. Supp. 1497, 1509-10 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (recognizing the remedial purpose of the ADA).
266. Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1024 (finding the Gregory rule to only apply when the
statutory language is ambiguous), Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 172-73 (concluding that Gregory
required Congress to make its intent "plain," and that the language of the ADA satis-
fied that requirement); Crawford, 115 F.3d at 487 (finding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar the application of the ADA to state prisons because Congress has
the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide for enforcement of the
ADA in federal court).
267. Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1024-25; Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 172-73; Crawford, 115 F.3d
at 485.
268. Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 173 (quoting Crawford, 115 F.3d at 486).
269. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465 (1991).
270. Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 173.
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Chevron, and then examine the approach used by decisions that did
not.
1. Courts That Apply Chevron
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit decided Bonner v. Lewis, 271 and was the
first court to find that the Rehab Act applied to state prisons. In
reaching its conclusion, the Bonner court looked to the DOJ regula-
tions, the broad language of the Rehab Act, and the purpose of the
statute.272 The prison officials argued that "it is unlikely that Congress
ever intended that [the Rehab Act] apply to prisoners." - " The court,
however, found that "the plain language of the Justice Department's
implementing regulations, and the Act itself.., belies their argu-
ment., 274 Despite the Bonner court's clear deference to the DOJ reg-
ulations, only one other appellate court has followed its reasoning in
deciding whether the ADA applies to state prisons.
In Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,275 the plaintiff
was denied admission to the prison boot camp program because of his
history of hypertension.276 In Yeskey, the Third Circuit found that the
statutory language was "all-encompassing," 27 and that the regulations
"make it clear" that the Rehab Act and the ADA apply to prisons.27s
Although the court doubted that state prisons "would not fall within
th[e] broad definition" of "program" under the ADA, in light of the
statute's silence on the issue, the court recognized Congress's express
delegation of rule-making authority to the DOJ, and deferred to its
regulations under Chevron.279 Although the plaintiff's claim centered
on access to a program, the court, through a lengthy investigation into
the regulations, demonstrated that the ADA was "intended to appl[y]
to anything a public entity does."'  Looking to the Rehab Act regu-
271. 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988).
272. Id. at 562. The court specifically noted that the Rehab Act's goals of "in-
dependent living and vocational rehabilitation should in fact mirror the goals of
prison officials as they attempt to rehabilitate prisoners and prepare them to lead
productive lives once their sentences are complete." Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citations omitted).
275. 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 876 (1998) (mem.).
276. Id. at 169.
277. Id. at 170.
278. Id. at 170-71.
279. Id. ("[T]he DOJ's regulations should be accorded 'controlling weight unless
[they are] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' (citing Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687,708 (1995)
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)) (alterations in original)). The court also defers to the preamble and
commentary to the regulations "since both are part of the DOJ's official interpreta-
tion of the legislation." 118 F.3d at 171 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 510-12 (1994)).
280. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, subpt. A at 456
(1997)).
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lations for guidance, the court found that a "benefit" and a "pro-
gram"-the terms that gave other courts difficulty 281-are adequately
defined in the regulations.28 2 A benefit is a "provision of services,...
or disposition (i.e. treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confine-
ment or other prescription of conduct). ' 2 3 This shows that the ADA
covers all of the operations of a prison, not just the educational or
work programs it offers. The court found that the ADA regulations
also unequivocally specify that the ADA mandates comprehensive ac-
commodation when the regulations state that correctional facilities
are required to provide "assistance in toileting, eating, or dressing" to
inmates with disabilities.2z ' In sum, the court found the ADA clearly
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and found that
Gregory did not apply because its holding was limited to core state
functions like determining the qualifications for elected officials. In
construing the ADA, the court found that it was silent on whether it
was to apply to state prisons, and deferred to the regulations, recog-
nizing both the express delegation to the DOJ and that the agency's
expertise made the agency better suited for determining the specifics
of the ADA's application to prisons. This court's analysis was consis-
tent with the remedial purposes of the ADA and Congress's intent
that the DOJ, and not courts, make the policy choices regarding the
statute's application.
2. Courts that Did Not Apply Chevron
The courts in both Crawford v. Indiana Department of Correc-
tions285 and Armstrong v. Wilson216 looked to the language of the
ADA and found it "expansive ,287 and "doubt[ed] ... that Congress
could speak much more clearly than it did. ' 28 Although they had
decided that a state prison was a "public entity" as defined by the
ADA,2 9 and despite their claim regarding the clarity of the statutory
language, both courts then questioned whether incarceration was a
"program" under the ADA.290 Rather than deciding that Congress
continued to be "expansive," and intended all prison operations to be
covered by the ADA, the courts decided that the prison itself pro-
vided programs which may be covered under the ADA. The Craw-
281. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text; see infra notes 290, 294 and
accompanying text.
282. 118 F.3d at 171 (quoting 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.540(h), 42.5400) (1997)).
283. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 42.5400)).
284. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, subpt. A at 468 (1996)).
285. 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
286. 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997).
287. Id. at 1023.
288. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 485.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
290. Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Crawford, 115 F.3d at 483); Crawford,
115 F.3d at 483.
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ford court went down the list of areas the plaintiff, a blind man, was
suing to get access to, and found each one "a little less clearly"29 1 a
program under the ADA.292 The Armstrong plaintiffs claimed the
prison provided limited work and educational programs to disabled
inmates which, in turn, denied them the ability to earn sentence reduc-
tion credits.293 Following the reasoning in Crawford, the Armstrong
court focused on the meaning of "program" and found those in ques-
tion to be "program[s] ... to which a disabled person might wish ac-
cess. ' 2 9 4 Both of these courts questioned how the ADA covers state
prisons. Moreover, rather than construing a prison as a program that
a state provides as a public entity under the statute, these courts indi-
cated that the ADA applies to the individual programs or services a
prison provides. Under Title II of the ADA, however, there are no
exceptions to the programs, activities, or services to which the statute
applies. Indeed, the DOJ regulations provide that the only defense is
that a modification to a program is unreasonable as an undue hardship
or fundamental alteration.295
What is most striking about the Crawford and Armstrong decisions
is that, while they admitted to questioning the interpretation that the
ADA applies to state prisons, they did not refer to the agency regula-
tions promulgated by the DOJ, the agency given the authority to ad-
minister regulations under Title II. Had they found the language clear
on whether the ADA applied to prisons, Chevron would not require
even a cursory examination of the agency regulations, let alone defer-
ence.296 But even in the face of the "expansive" language- 97 of the
ADA, both courts found it doubtful that the ADA applied to all as-
pects of prison operations. This created an ambiguity-as to whether
the ADA covered only programs provided by the prison, or the prison
itself-that should have triggered the Chevron analysis.293 The Arm-
strong court's failure to follow Chevron and defer to the regulations is
even more striking in light of the lower court's favorable considera-
tion of the regulations and their applicability. 2"
291. 115 F.3d at 483.
292. The programs at issue were the prison education program, use of the prison
library, and the use of the prison dining hall. Id.
293. 124 F.3d at 1021.
294. Id. at 1023 (quoting Crawford, 115 F.3d at 483 (emphasis added)).
295. See supra note 59.
296. See supra Part III.B.1.
297. 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (1997).
298. See supra Part III.B.1.
299. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252. 1257-60 (N.D. Ca. 1996), affd.
123 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed. 66 U.S.LW. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20,
1997) (No. 97-686). In Armstrong, the lower court construed both the Rehab Act and
the ADA, and stated that "[tihe broad language of the statute ... imparts to ... the
DOJ[ ] the task of defining the term, 'any program."' 942 F. Supp at 1257-58. Further-
more, the court cited Chevron for its holding that when Congress has left a -gap for
the agency to fill, the agency's regulations 'are given controlling weight."' i. at 1257.
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C. The Turner Question and Textualism
Further complicating the analysis in the prison context is the
Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Safely,300 which held that a
prison regulation that infringes on a prisoner's constitutional rights
will be valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests.301 All courts that have addressed the question of the ADA's ap-
plication to state prisons have noted the special circumstances of
prisons, and some courts have found Turner relevant on this issue. 302
Although the issue before these courts was whether a prisoner could
state a claim under the ADA, many courts opined as to the practical
effects of such an application. 30 3 Most of these courts see Turner as
validating their "common sense" conclusion that the ADA does not,
or was not meant to, cover state prisons.
The Turner "reasonableness test" establishes the appropriate level
of deference that courts should give prison management decisions that
infringe on prisoners' constitutional rights. 30 4 In Gates v. Rowland,
30 5
300. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that a regulation restricting marriage by prison
inmates violated the Fourteenth and First Amendments, but that a regulation restrict-
ing who inmates could write to did not violate the Constitution).
301. Id. at 89.
302. Only one court has applied Turner to an ADA claim, see Gates v. Rowland, 39
F.3d 1439, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1994), but most courts considering the issue have been
ruling on summary judgement motions. The Amos court found that the Gates deci-
sion supported its conclusion that the ADA did not apply to state prisons. See Amos
v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 607 (4th Cir.
1997). The Crawford court also made a number of statements that expressed disbelief
at successfully applying the ADA to prisons. The court said "the plaintiff has stated a
claim under [the ADA]. It might not be a good claim." Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997). The court further addressed the cir-
cumstances under which a court can legitimately create an exception to a statute
which has no basis in the text, including when it "is necessary to save the statute from
generating absurd consequences." Id. at 485. The court went on to say that "[it might
seem absurd to apply [the ADA] to prisoners," and "[o]f course the failure to exclude
prisoners from the Act may well ... have been an oversight." Id. at 486-87. Finally,
citing Turner, the court said that the different circumstances of prisons have been
"emphasized in the parallel setting of prisoners' constitutional rights." Id. at 487. The
court in King v. Edgar went further than the Crawford court, and said that "it is so
unlikely that Congress envisioned mandating equal participation for disabled prison-
ers that an exception should be inferred." No. 96 C 4137, 1996 WL 705256, at *4 (N.D.
I11. Dec. 4, 1996).
303. This is despite the fact that the application of the ADA and the determination
of the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation is a fact-intensive, case-by-case
consideration, and is "generally a fact question not amenable to summary determina-
tion." Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373, 1389 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (deny-
ing a motion for summary judgement to consider the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
requested accommodation of limiting leaf burning in the municipality to certain hours
because the smoke and particles caused by the burning aggravated her severe respira-
tory and cardiac conditions, making her unable to breathe).
304. The court reviewing a prison regulation should look to four factors: (1)
whether there is a valid and rational connection between the regulation and the legiti-
mate governmental interest; (2) whether there are any alternative means for prisoners
to exercise the right under consideration; (3) the impact that accommodation of the
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the court applied the Turner test to a Rehab Act claim, even though
Turner had previously only been applied to prison regulations that af-
fected prisoners' constitutional rights. 30 6 The Gates court employed
Turner because, although there was no explicit textual indication re-
garding congressional intent to have the Rehab Act cover prisons,
"[i]t is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more stringent appli-
cation of the prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act than it
would the prisoners' constitutional rights.- 30 7
The Amos and Callaway courts found that the Gates decision sup-
ported their contention that state prisons are a state function that re-
quires a congressional, rather than a judicial, decision that they are
covered under the ADA. These courts argue that, even if the ADA
does apply to prisons, the Turner test is "the functional equivalent of
the decision that the [ADA] does not apply,"'30 and would "effec-
tively eviscerate[ ] the [ADA] in the prison context," -' 9 because its
four-prong test will prevent most applications of the ADA in prisons.
Even if Congress had intended the ADA to cover state prisons, these
courts further assume that Congress would have restricted the rights
the ADA grants. The lower court in Crawford, using reasoning simi-
lar to that in Amos and Callaway, found that the uniqueness of the
prison environment as indicated by the Supreme Court's previous def-
erence to prison management 310 created a "common sense" presump-
tion that the Rehab Act and the ADA were not intended to apply to
prisons.31' In evaluating the other circuit courts' conclusions that the
ADA applies to prisons, the Amos court characterized their recogni-
asserted right will have on security, the allocation of prison resources and prison staff,
and the general inmate population; and (4) whether ready alternatives exist for the
prison officials to accomplish their objectives without infringing on inmates' rights.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see also Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's
America Meets Dante's Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison, 15
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 49, 93-97 (1996) (discussing Turner as applied to constitutional
and ADA claims).
305. 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
306. Robbins, supra note 304, at 96.
307. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447.
308. Callaway, 1998 WL 25627, at *4.
309. Amos v Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs.. 126 F.3d 589,
607 (4th Cir. 1997).
310. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224-27 (1990) (holding that a
prison policy to administer drugs to mentally ill patients against their %ill was legiti-
mate under the Turner test and did not violate the Due Process Clause): Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) ("[Tlhe problems of prisons ... are not readily
susceptible of resolution by decree.... [Clourts are ill equipped to deal with...
problems of prison administration and reform .... Moreover, where state penal insti-
tutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appro-
priate prison authorities.").
311. Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 937 F. Supp. 785, 791 (N.D. Ind.
1996), rev'd, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the circuit court ultimately re-
versed this decision, it nevertheless expressed similar sentiments. See supra note 302
for statements expressing similar sentiments made by the circuit court in its decision
to reverse.
2274 [Vol. 66
DISABILITIES ACT & STATE PRISONS
tion of the possible difficulties arising from the application of the
ADA to prisons as "acknowledg[ements] of the chaos that will likely
result from their holdings. 31 2
Because all of these courts based their holdings on a "common
sense," textualist reading of the statute, they failed to acknowledge
the flexibility and adaptability inherent in the ADA through its
unique reasonable accommodation and undue burden inquiries.313
For this reason, in Niece v. Fitzner,314 the court argued that the ADA's
provision for "reasonable accommodation" rebuts the Fourth Circuit's
claim that the complexity of applying the ADA to prisons means it is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.315  To refute the "horrors
portended" by the Torcasio court, the Niece court concluded that if "a
modification ... would seriously jeopardize the security of other in-
mates or of prison officials, [then it] would not be 'suitable under the
circumstances,' and would therefore not by [sic] 'reasonable.' ' 316
312. 126 F.3d at 600. The Crawford court stated that the "security concerns that the
defendant rightly emphasizes ... are highly relevant." 115 F.3d at 487. The court in
Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Safety and Corrections, acknowledged
"the specter of federal court management of state prisons," and that "[a]pplication of
the ADA to ... prison management would place nearly every aspect of prison man-
agement into the court's hands." 118 F.3d 168, 174 (3rd Cir. 1997).
313. For a discussion of the "reasonable accommodation" provision in the ADA,
see supra Part I.B.
314. 941 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Mich. 1996). Coming to a similar conclusion, one
court has found Turner to be limited to security concerns. In Purcell v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, No. CIV. A. 95-6720, 1998 WL 10236 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
1998). the court held the state prison to the reasonable accommodation standard de-
fined in the ADA regulations. 1998 WL 10236, at *8. On whether Turner applied, the
court further found that if the challenged prison policies concerned security issues,
"then they 'are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of correc-
tions officials."' Id. (citing Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987) (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). Because the prison officials "made no allega-
tions [that] any of the actions taken regarding Purcell were occasioned by prison se-
curity concerns ... the special deference ... described in Turner is not warranted
here." Id. Thus, this court limited Turner's reach to those occasions where prison
officials themselves raise security as an issue. Id.; see also Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F.3d
1355, 1357 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that Turner does not apply to prisoner's constitu-
tional claims if the basis for prison regulation was "general budgetary and policy
choices").
315. Niece, 941 F. Supp. at 1511.
316. Id. at 1510 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990)). Although
the Niece court relied on the DOJ regulations to first conclude that the ADA applies
to prisons, it referred to a dictionary, a traditional textualist tool, to support its claim
that the Turner test is not necessary. Id. at 1506-07, 1510. If the Niece court again
thought that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer," it would have found
that the DOJ regulations define in detail what considerations should be made in the
reasonable accommodation inquiry. Id. at 1506-07 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The regulations
indicate that the "reasonable" prong takes the nature of the "service, program, or
activity" into account. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (1997). Furthermore, unlike the dic-
tionary definition, the regulations include examples of how compliance may be
achieved. Id. § 35.150(b)(1). The regulations state:
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Other courts have found Turner completely inapplicable on the ba-
sis of the plain language of the ADA or Rehab Act.317 In Onishea v.
Hopper,318 the court held that Turner did not apply on the grounds
that "rights under the [Rehab Act] emanate from [the legislative and
administrative] branches, and thus ought not be subject to Turner's
requirements without a congressional indication to that effect. 319
Second, the court found the Turner test and the Rehab Act's reason-
able accommodation inquiry to be "in some ways duplicative." 30
Third, the court relied on precedent that had not subjected prisoners'
statutory claims to the Turner test. 2' In Raines v. Florida,3  the dis-
trict court also rejected the application of Turner to a prisoner's ADA
claim, recognizing the difference between the statutory rights granted
by the ADA and constitutional rights, which "depend[ ] entirely upon
judicial decisions to determine [their] scope. ' '31 The Raines court ap-
proved of the Onishea court's reasoning as a "faithful adherence to
the plain language of the statute... [and an] understanding that the
ADA is a statute which should be implemented without added judicial
gloss. ' 3 4 Courts that hold that the ADA and Rehab Act do not apply
to state prisons, and even some of the courts that find prisons covered
under those statutes, look to Turner, none of these courts defers to the
regulations. Even if the Turner test and the ADA's reasonable accom-
modation inquiry lead to the same result in some instances, courts
should not ignore Congress's express intent regarding the DOJ's au-
thority to implement these statutory rights and instead rely on a judi-
cially created test for judicially construed rights.
A public entity may comply with the requirements of this section through
such means as redesign of equipment, reassignment of services to accessible
buildings .... A public entity is not required to make structural changes in
existing facilities where other methods are effective .... In choosing among
available methods ... a public entity shall give priority to those methods that
offer sbrvices, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with disabili-
ties in the most integrated setting appropriate.
Id. This section of the regulations applies to existing facilities only. Different factors
are considered when the ADA is applied to new construction. See id. § 35.151. Note
that the only mandatory portion-where Congress used the word "shall"-of this reg-
ulation is the requirement that the entity choose the option that %%ill result in the most
integration. Otherwise, the list is illustrative-using the word "may"-not exclusive.
317. Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated and reh'g granted,
133 F.3d 1377 (11th Cir. 1998); Raines v. Florida, 987 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
318. 126 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1997).
319. Id. at 1336.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 987 F. Supp. 1416, 1416 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
323. Id. at 1420.
324. Id.
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V. WHY TEXTUALISM SHOULD NOT BE USED TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE ADA APPLIES TO STATE PRISONS
Although intentionalism and textualism have the same goal-to in-
terpret statutes according to congressional intent-their disagreement
over how to be faithful to that intent can lead to different interpreta-
tions of a statute. The courts' uses of textualism has limited the appli-
cation of the ADA in two ways: (1) some use textualism to find that
the ADA does not apply to state prisons; and (2) the courts which
reach the opposite conclusion often rely on textualism and avoid de-
ferring to the appropriate agency regulations.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero State Hospi-
tal v. Scanlon,325 the Eleventh Amendment plain statement rule has
become a textualist test for determining whether Congress intended
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to be abrogated. 26 If the stat-
utory language-notwithstanding any legislative history-is at all am-
biguous as to whether Congress intended to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court has found that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear private suits against
states for violations of that statute. In the cases addressing the ADA's
application to state prisons, however, no court doubts that Congress
has satisfied the textualist Atascadero test. It is only when a court
finds prisons to be a core state function, and thus deems Gregory v.
Ashcroft327 to be applicable, that the abrogation question becomes an
issue.
Finding that Gregory extends the plain statement rule to require
Congress to unequivocally specify what state functions it intends for a
statute to reach is, however, not a foregone conclusion. First, the
Court applied the plain statement rule in Gregory because of the fed-
eralism concerns raised by applying a federal law to deny state citizens
the ability to determine the length of service for state judges.328 It is
unclear what other state functions would involve similar issues of fed-
eralism that could overcome Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Second, while the Gregory Court said Congress must make its in-
tent "plain," it also said that Congress was not required to create a
comprehensive list of all the traditional state functions to which it in-
tended the federal law to apply.329 Therefore, even if the Gregory
plain statement rule is found to apply, courts should not require Con-
gress to identify every state function to which the ADA would apply
to avoid a finding of ambiguity on the abrogation question. Title II of
325. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
326. Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 14, at 621.
327. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
328. Id. at 467.




the ADA satisfies the Gregory standard that it must be "plain to any-
one reading the [statute] '330 that Congress intended the statute to
cover every state function. Title II does not contain a single exception
to its coverage of every program, service, or activity provided by state
and local governments.331 In other words, in addition to the over-
whelming evidence of a congressional intent to abrogate, as demon-
strated in the express language and broad purpose of the statute, there
is no evidence of an intent not to abrogate.332 The Amos, Torcasio,
and Callaway courts, however, searched the language of the ADA for
a textualist abrogation that meets the standard of the Atascadero plain
statement rule, not that of the Gregory rule. This textualist version of
the Gregory rule requires Congress to, in essence, explicitly express its
intent to abrogate regarding state prisons, or any other traditional
state function. This is precisely the type of comprehensive list that
Gregory said was not required. Without ambiguity, the Gregory plain
statement rule cannot be applied and, if a court remains true to the
Gregory rule, it would find the statute unambiguous as to the intent
that the ADA cover all public entities, even those considered to be
"core state functions," as evidenced both by the text and purpose of
the statute. Indeed, the courts which find it "unlikely" or "absurd"
that terms like "program" and "benefit" include prisons are not rely-
ing on the text but on what the courts regard as the ordinary meaning
of these words. Once they decide upon the ordinary meaning, they do
not need to look further for other indications regarding the words'
intended meaning. The language of the statute, however, makes the
broad focus of the ADA clear-indeed, it is difficult to read it nar-
rowly. Furthermore, as a remedial statute, it should be read as
broadly as possible in keeping with congressional intent.
Textualism, because it searches for the statute's "ordinary mean-
ing," can create ambiguity because it prevents courts from looking to
the purpose of the statute for guidance on its meaning.3 3 Even within
the language of the statute, the Amos and Callaway courts could have
330. Id
331. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1994). Furthermore, the ADA, in its entirety, contains
very few, highly specific exceptions. For examples, see id. § 12208 (providing that the
term "disability" will not apply solely because someone is a transvestite); id. § 12211
(providing that homosexuality and bisexuality are not disabilities under the ADA);
and id. § 12114 (providing that the ADA does not apply to a current user of illegal
drugs but will apply to someone who is currently in or has successfully completed a
rehabilitation program). In interpreting Title II, the court in Kaufinan v. Carter stated
that "[a]ttempting to demonstrate that 'any' [public entity].... in fact means 'any' is
like attempting to prove a negative." 952 F. Supp. 520, 529 (W.D. Mich. 1996). The
court further found that "[s]ince Congress obviously considered whether transvestites
were or were not to be considered disabled, no reason exists to believe it simply over-
looked the presumably far larger prisoner population." Id.
332. See Raines v. Florida, 983 F. Supp. 1362, 1370-71 (N.D. Fla. 1997) ("There is
no ambiguity in the statute .... It is inescapable, therefore, that Congress intended
the ADA to apply to state prisoners.").
333. Merrill, supra note 18, at 1002.
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discovered that the ADA was passed pursuant to Congress's authority
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 334 a power which
the Supreme Court has recognized as able to abrogate states' Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity.335 As one court said: "There
is no room for doubt that Congress specifically intended to alter the
federal-state balance in enacting the ADA .... [It] specifically in-
vokes the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the legislation. ' 336
Thus, Congress clearly meant the ADA to reach even the public enti-
ties that are traditionally within the states' control; a broad range of
other traditional areas of state responsibility, like schools, police and
fire departments, and the court system, have all been held to be cov-
ered by the ADA and Rehab Act, and the text of the ADA must be
read to include state prisons.
If a court disagrees with this broad textualist analysis, however, and
finds the statute ambiguous regarding congressional intent to abro-
gate. the statute will not cover that state function and will create a gap
in the ADA's coverage, which otherwise applies to almost every other
entity, public or private. Congress's comments that the Court in Atas-
cadero, by focusing on the text of the statute, had misinterpreted con-
gressional intent regarding another disability law, the Rehab Act,
illustrates how textualism can result in a reading of a statute that is
contrary to Congress's intent and the statute's goal of "a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities." '337 Thus, applying textualism in
this way would result in a gap in coverage in a statute Congress clearly
and explicitly intended to have broad applicability; in other words,
textualism leads courts to reach conclusions obviously contrary to
Congress's explicit intent.
The courts that concluded that the ADA applies only to certain pro-
grams offered by state prisons, like textualists, misread the language
of the statute and created further opportunity for litigation regarding
[I]f courts do the gap filling at step one [of Chevron] under the 'plain mean-
ing' nostrum by applying dictionary definitions, rules of grammar, and ca-
nons of construction, then the content of national policy will be determined
by courts without any consideration of the substantive values at issue in the
policy disputes-either those that animated Congress or those articulated by
the agency charged with the administration of the statute.
Id.
334. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) ("It is the purpose of this chapter... to invoke the
sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment.., in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities.").
335. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
336. Kaufman, 952 F. Supp. at 531; see also Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating, with regard to the provision in the ADA that says Congress
enacted it pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, "we give great deference to con-
gressional statements"), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997)
(No. 97-686).
337. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
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whether specific aspects of prison operations are "programs" under
the ADA. While education and work programs will probably be
found to be covered, accessible bathrooms, dining halls, and recrea-
tional rooms do not fit the "ordinary meaning" of "program" as easily.
This piecemeal interpretation-which is contrary to the broad goals of
the ADA-would be avoided if the prison itself is seen as the "pro-
gram" provided by the state as a public entity under the ADA.3  The
courts' hesitation to apply the ADA across the board should have led
them to apply Chevron and the regulations, which cover all aspects of
prison operations. The regulations further provide that if it would be
an undue burden or a fundamental alteration for the prison to provide
reasonable accommodation to the prisoner-a case-by-case, fact-de-
pendant inquiry-then the prison would have no obligations under
the statute.
Courts that used intentionalism interpreted the ADA to apply to all
prison operations and thereby were faithful to congressional intent.
Intentionalism used to discern whether Congress intended the ADA
to cover state prisons-either under the Gregory plain statement rule
or the Chevron step-one question-should lead courts to find an un-
qualified application of the ADA. Intentionalism, moreover, unlike
textualism, would also find answers for the courts that questioned the
wisdom and manner of the ADA's application to state prisons. A
court questioning Congress's intent to subject state prisons to private
suits under the ADA, by applying Gregory, should look to the statu-
tory purpose, the nature of the anti-discriminatory right, and the legis-
lative intent expressed in the findings of the statute. Those sources
indicate that the ADA's coverage was intentionally broad, and that
private rights of action are necessary to ensure the most comprehen-
sive implementation possible. If a court then finds congressional in-
tent ambiguous as to whether a prison is itself a "program," or instead
only provides "programs," intentionalism should direct it, under
Chevron, to defer to the regulations. Congress delegated the author-
ity to issue regulations to the DOJ, and those regulations state that,
without exception, the ADA covers "all services, programs, and activi-
ties provided or made available by public entities," ' " 3 and is meant to
"appl[y] to anything a public entity does."-' 0 The purpose of Chevron
is not simply to aid a court when it cannot discern the meaning of a
statutory term, but to establish a hierarchy for determining which
branch of government is best suited for policy-making. When Con-
gress explicitly delegates rule-making authority to the DOJ, and fur-
ther says that the ADA regulations should follow those under the
Rehab Act, this express intent is also directed at courts. Otherwise,
338. See id. § 12131.
339. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (1997).
340. Id. pt. 35, app. A, subpt. A at 466.
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this delegation would be meaningless because courts would never de-
fer to the expertise of the DOJ.
Furthermore, not only does deferring to the regulations resolve any
ambiguity on whether Congress intended the ADA to apply to state
prisons, but it also brings the reasonable accommodation and undue
burden inquiries to the court's attention. As the regulations clearly
state, the covered entity does not have to comply if reasonable accom-
modation will "result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a
service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative
burdens." '341
Because the language of the ADA is unequivocal, either intention-
alism or textualism should lead a court to find that the ADA applies
to all aspects of prisons and prison management. The Amos and Cal-
laway courts found that Congress did not intend for the ADA to apply
to state prisons because they misapplied Gregory to require the ADA
to contain a specific abrogation as to state prisons. The Crawford and
Armstrong courts rested their interpretations of the ADA solely on
the text of the statute, but misread the text and brought in extra-tex-
tual issues-security concerns and the Turner test-without looking to
extra-textual sources for answers. The standards these courts set for
the ADA are extraordinarily high, in that only express statements that
Congress intended the ADA to cover state prisons, to give prisoners
the right of reasonable accommodation of their disabilities, and not to
judicially restrict that right by the Turner test, would result in prison-
ers having a right to be free from discrimination guaranteed by the
ADA.
Reasonable accommodation and undue burden are concepts central
to the ADA's goal of integration. To ignore these concepts and look
to Turner is counter-majoritarian 342 and is yet another way to insert
federalism issues into the ADA's application to state prisons, for those
courts that find the Gregory argument too attenuated.343 The Turner
test may duplicate some of the issues that will arise when a prisoner
with a disability requests reasonable accommodation. The Supreme
Court, however, created the Turner test to restrict judicially construed
constitutional rights. To restrict the ADA, a statutory right, on a tex-
tualist reading, without any indication that Congress intended such a
restriction, oversteps the line between interpretation and legislation.
341. Id. § 35.150(a)(3).
342. Justice White, in his concurrence in Gregory v. Ashcroft, argued that for the
Court to impose a clear statement rule "fashion[s] a restraint on Congress' legislative
authority .... [It] is both counter-majoritarian and an intrusion on a coequal branch
of the Federal Government." 501 U.S. 452, 477 (1991). To apply the Turner test-like
the plain statement rule-is to superimpose a judicially construed standard onto
rights statutorily created by Congress, like the ADEA and ADA.
343. Onishea v. Hopper, 126 F.3d 1323, 1336 n.23 (lth Cir. 1997) ("Of course,
Turner also serves federalism concerns by keeping federal authority out of state
prison management ...."), vacated and reh'g granted, 133 F.3d 1377 (11 th Cir. 1998).
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To look to Turner and consider its application to the ADA, is, in ef-
fect, a finding of textual ambiguity-a conclusion that Congress did
not clearly intend that all public entities, including state prisons, to
comply with the statutory rights at issue-and should therefore trigger
the Chevron doctrine. The courts that rely on a textualist reading of
the ADA, do not reach their conclusions as a result of finding the
statutory language ambiguous. Rather, they say their interpretations
of the statute are based on the plain language of the ADA. Courts
influenced by textualism, however, can claim that their hesitation to
find that the ADA applies to prisons is the result of the "ordinary"
meaning of a term and, therefore, there is no ambiguity. Intentional-
ism, on the other hand, does not look for the ordinary meaning of a
word, but for what Congress intended the word to mean. To claim
that the unique concerns of state prisons raise the question of whether
Turner should apply means that the court is questioning the congres-
sional intent on this issue, but if a court finds the statutory language
ambiguous as to what Congress intended, it should look to other
sources.
The reluctance to find the ordinary or plain meaning of the lan-
guage of the ADA to include state prisons and prisoners stems from
assumptions about the incompatibility of reasonable accommodation
and incarceration and punishment. Turner and other prison constitu-
tional rights cases, however, are an inappropriate background upon
which to interpret the ADA. For example, a prisoner claiming the
circumstances of her confinement constitutes cruel and unusual treat-
ment under the Eighth Amendment must prove the prison official's
culpable state of mind.3 " In contrast, a deaf prisoner who alleges dis-
crimination under the ADA because he was not provided with a sign
language interpreter for prison disciplinary procedures3 5 has to prove
only that he is a qualified individual with a disability, that he could be
reasonably accommodated, and that the prison is a covered entity
under the ADA.34 There are, however, no requirements for intent.
The ADA was specifically conceived to eliminate this kind of uninten-
tional discrimination which has a "disparate impact" on individuals
with disabilities.
Another barrier may be that courts regard reasonable accommoda-
tion as special treatment, a notion that contradicts the nature of incar-
344. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). The Supreme Court has explained that
"[i]f the pain infficted is not formally meted out as punislhment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer
before it can qualify" as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 300.
345. Randolph v. Rodgers, 980 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo. 1997); see also Hanson v.
Sangamon County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 97-3175, 1998 WL 34773 (C.D. I11. Jan. 28,
1998) (holding that a profoundly deaf plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA
because he was not provided with a TDD telephone to call family after being
arrested).
346. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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ceration. To provide reasonable accommodation to prevent prisoners
with disabilities from enduring more punishment than non-disabled
prisoners is not special treatment. For example, a bilateral amputee
inmate claimed that because there were no handrails in the shower
and toilet area, he repeatedly fell and hurt himself while trying to use
the facilities.347 To provide accommodations to remedy this problem
only ensures that the disabled prisoner does not suffer psychologically
or physically more than non-disabled prisoners.
Furthermore, integration should not be considered foreign to the
goals of incarceration. The court in Saunders v. Horn34 found the
policies of the ADA to "mirror" those behind incarceration, 349 and
that the ADA could serve to implement the goals of incarceration.
The agency that administers the ADA, and many in the corrections
community,350 recognize that the ADA and incarceration are
compatible.
CONCLUSION
Prisoners with disabilities, like anyone else, deserve the right the
ADA provides: the right to have their disabilities reasonably accom-
modated. The plain language of the ADA contains no exceptions re-
garding which public entities it applies to, nor any limitations on the
extent of the application of the ADA, except for the defenses of un-
due burden and fundamental alteration. Instead of creating unneces-
sary complications, courts should defer to the DOJ regulations which
take the broad statutory mandate and balance it with the unique, but
not necessarily more complex, issues that prisons present. Applying
the Gregory plain statement rule and relying solely on a textualist
347. Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F. Supp. 520, 523-24 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
348. 960 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Penn. 1997).
349. Id. at 898 (quoting Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 1998).
350. Corrections Today, published by the American Correctional Association, has
published an issue devoted to the application of the ADA to prisons, entitled ADA,
Construction and Corrections. Corrections Today, April 1995. One author states that
"integration into mainstream society-even a prison or jail 'society'-is a cornerstone
of the ADA." Paula N. Rubin, The Americans with Disabilities Act's Impact on Cor-
rections, Corrections Today, April 1995, at 119. Another states that "[f]ears that com-
plying with the ADA will break the bank are greatly exaggerated." Darlene Van
Sickle, Avoiding Lawsuits: A Summary of ADA Provisions and Remedies, Correc-
tions Today, April 1995, at 104, 106. In new facilities built in compliance with the
ADA, the additional cost of compliance was 3.6% and .83% of the total. Alan Appel,
Requirements and Rewards of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Corrections Today,
April 1995, at 84, 85. Another article discusses the Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections negotiations with the ADA board on the percentage of housing that had to
be accessible. Curtiss Pulitzer & Jacob Bliek, Making the Transition to Meet ADA
Requirements Systemwide, Corrections Today, April 1995, at 90. The Architectural
and Transportations Barriers Compliance Board, which promulgates rules and regula-
tions in those areas, proposed rules in a special section for detention and correctional
facilities, for which there were public hearings and almost 7,000 pages in commentary.
Id. at 92.
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reading prevents courts from recognizing that the ADA's ambitious
purpose is matched by a detailed implementation scheme.
The Supreme Court should affirm Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections v. Yeskey, and uphold the Yeskey court's use of Chevron to
defer to the DOJ regulations. Not only will this provide prisoners
with disabilities with a right against discrimination, it will also aid in
the enforcement of the broad mandate of the ADA. Furthermore, an
affirmance will clarify the limitations of Gregory, eliminating unneces-
sary challenges like the one that gave rise to Yeskey.
